Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Travels in Four Dimensions' and 'The Emotions'

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66 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
The personal view can still be objective, so I call sciences 'impersonal', rather than objective [Goldie]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
A thing which makes no difference seems unlikely to exist [Le Poidevin]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
In addition to causal explanations, they can also be inferential, or definitional, or purposive [Le Poidevin]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / c. Knowing other minds
We know other's emotions by explanation, contagion, empathy, imagination, or sympathy [Goldie]
Empathy and imagining don't ensure sympathy, and sympathy doesn't need them [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / a. Nature of emotions
'Having an emotion' differs from 'being emotional' [Goldie]
Unlike moods, emotions have specific objects, though the difference is a matter of degree [Goldie]
Emotional intentionality as belief and desire misses out the necessity of feelings [Goldie]
A long lasting and evolving emotion is still seen as a single emotion, such as love [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
Some Aborigines have fifteen different words for types of fear [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Emotional responses can reveal to us our values, which might otherwise remain hidden [Goldie]
If we have a 'feeling towards' an object, that gives the recognition a different content [Goldie]
When actions are performed 'out of' emotion, they appear to be quite different [Goldie]
It is best to see emotions holistically, as embedded in a person's life narrative [Goldie]
If emotions are 'towards' things, they can't be bodily feelings, which lack aboutness [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / d. Emotional feeling
Moods can focus as emotions, and emotions can blur into moods [Goldie]
If reasons are seen impersonally (as just causal), then feelings are an irrelevant extra [Goldie]
We have feelings of which we are hardly aware towards things in the world [Goldie]
An emotion needs episodes of feeling, but not continuously [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / e. Basic emotions
Emotions are not avocado pears, with a rigid core and changeable surface [Goldie]
A basic emotion is the foundation of a hierarchy, such as anger for types of annoyance [Goldie]
Early Chinese basic emotions: joy, anger, sadness, fear, love, disliking, and liking [Goldie]
Cross-cultural studies of facial expressions suggests seven basic emotions [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / f. Emotion and reason
Some emotions are direct responses, and neither rational nor irrational [Goldie]
Emotional thought is not rational, but it can be intelligible [Goldie]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Learning an evaluative property like 'dangerous' is also learning an emotion [Goldie]
We call emotions 'passions' because they are not as controlled as we would like [Goldie]
Emotional control is hard, but we are responsible for our emotions over long time periods [Goldie]
Emotions are not easily changed, as new knowledge makes little difference, and akrasia is possible [Goldie]
Emotional control is less concerned with emotional incidents, and more with emotional tendencies [Goldie]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
We don't just describe a time as 'now' from a private viewpoint, but as a fact about the world [Le Poidevin]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
Akrasia can be either overruling our deliberation, or failing to deliberate [Goldie]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
Justifying reasons say you were right; excusing reasons say your act was explicable [Goldie]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
Character traits are both possession of and lack of dispositions [Goldie]
We over-estimate the role of character traits when explaining behaviour [Goldie]
Psychologists suggest we are muddled about traits, and maybe they should be abandoned [Goldie]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 1. Causation
The logical properties of causation are asymmetry, transitivity and irreflexivity [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
We can identify unoccupied points in space, so they must exist [Le Poidevin]
If spatial points exist, then they must be stationary, by definition [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Absolute space explains actual and potential positions, and geometrical truths [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
For relationists moving an object beyond the edge of space creates new space [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
We distinguish time from space, because it passes, and it has a unique present moment [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / e. Eventless time
Since nothing occurs in a temporal vacuum, there is no way to measure its length [Le Poidevin]
Temporal vacuums would be unexperienced, unmeasured, and unending [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
Time can't speed up or slow down, so it doesn't seem to be a 'process' [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
To say that the past causes the present needs them both to be equally real [Le Poidevin]
The B-series doesn't seem to allow change [Le Poidevin]
If the B-universe is eternal, why am I trapped in a changing moment of it? [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / g. Time's arrow
An ordered series can be undirected, but time favours moving from earlier to later [Le Poidevin]
If time's arrow is causal, how can there be non-simultaneous events that are causally unconnected? [Le Poidevin]
If time's arrow is psychological then different minds can impose different orders on events [Le Poidevin]
There are Thermodynamic, Psychological and Causal arrows of time [Le Poidevin]
Presumably if time's arrow is thermodynamic then time ends when entropy is complete [Le Poidevin]
If time is thermodynamic then entropy is necessary - but the theory says it is probable [Le Poidevin]
Time's arrow is not causal if there is no temporal gap between cause and effect [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / i. Time and motion
Instantaneous motion is an intrinsic disposition to be elsewhere [Le Poidevin]
The dynamic view of motion says it is primitive, and not reducible to objects, properties and times [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / k. Temporal truths
If the present could have diverse pasts, then past truths can't have present truthmakers [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / a. Beginning of time
The present is the past/future boundary, so the first moment of time was not present [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / c. Intervals
The primitive parts of time are intervals, not instants [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
If time is infinitely divisible, then the present must be infinitely short [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 10. Multiverse
The multiverse is distinct time-series, as well as spaces [Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Our capabilities did not all evolve during the hunter gathering period [Goldie]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
How could a timeless God know what time it is? So could God be both timeless and omniscient? [Le Poidevin]