13 ideas
9312 | Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford] |
9315 | Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford] |
9313 | Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford] |
9316 | How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford] |
9314 | Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford] |
3444 | If actions are not caused by other events, and are not causeless, they must be caused by the person [Chisholm] |
3446 | For Hobbes (but not for Kant) a person's actions can be deduced from their desires and beliefs [Chisholm] |
9268 | If free will miraculously interrupts causation, animals might do that; why would we want to do it? [Frankfurt on Chisholm] |
3442 | Responsibility seems to conflict with events being either caused or not caused [Chisholm] |
3443 | Desires may rule us, but are we responsible for our desires? [Chisholm] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
3445 | Causation among objects relates either events or states [Chisholm] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |