16 ideas
15127 | A categorical basis could hardly explain a disposition if it had no powers of its own [Hawthorne] |
15123 | Is the causal profile of a property its essence? [Hawthorne] |
15122 | Could two different properties have the same causal profile? [Hawthorne] |
15124 | If properties are more than their powers, we could have two properties with the same power [Hawthorne] |
15128 | We can treat the structure/form of the world differently from the nodes/matter of the world [Hawthorne] |
14221 | Serious essentialism says everything has essences, they're not things, and they ground necessities [Shalkowski] |
15121 | An individual essence is a necessary and sufficient profile for a thing [Hawthorne] |
14222 | Essences are what it is to be that (kind of) thing - in fact, they are the thing's identity [Shalkowski] |
14226 | We distinguish objects by their attributes, not by their essences [Shalkowski] |
14225 | Critics say that essences are too mysterious to be known [Shalkowski] |
14223 | De dicto necessity has linguistic entities as their source, so it is a type of de re necessity [Shalkowski] |
14224 | Equilateral and equiangular aren't the same, as we have to prove their connection [Shalkowski] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
15126 | Maybe scientific causation is just generalisation about the patterns [Hawthorne] |
15125 | We only know the mathematical laws, but not much else [Hawthorne] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |