Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Essence and Being' and 'Analyticity Reconsidered'

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21 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
9376 A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
9375 Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
14221 Serious essentialism says everything has essences, they're not things, and they ground necessities [Shalkowski]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
14222 Essences are what it is to be that (kind of) thing - in fact, they are the thing's identity [Shalkowski]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
14226 We distinguish objects by their attributes, not by their essences [Shalkowski]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
14225 Critics say that essences are too mysterious to be known [Shalkowski]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14223 De dicto necessity has linguistic entities as their source, so it is a type of de re necessity [Shalkowski]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
9369 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9367 The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian]
9373 That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian]
9380 We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9384 We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9374 If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
9378 If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian]
9377 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
9372 Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
14224 Equilateral and equiangular aren't the same, as we have to prove their connection [Shalkowski]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
17721 There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
9368 Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
13304 Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
20820 Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]