50 ideas
| 4767 | Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons [Psillos] |
| 19335 | Reasonings have a natural ordering in God's understanding, but only a temporal order in ours [Leibniz] |
| 4810 | Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added [Psillos] |
| 4768 | The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist [Psillos] |
| 4808 | If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos] |
| 4807 | A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos] |
| 4811 | Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises [Psillos] |
| 4812 | Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations [Psillos] |
| 4802 | Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law [Psillos] |
| 4804 | The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events [Psillos] |
| 4805 | If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole [Psillos] |
| 4395 | There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations [Psillos] |
| 4806 | An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink [Psillos] |
| 4404 | Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner [Psillos] |
| 4803 | An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event [Psillos] |
| 4769 | It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind [Psillos] |
| 19367 | Saying we must will whatever we decide to will leads to an infinite regress [Leibniz] |
| 19351 | Perfections of soul subordinate the body, but imperfections of soul submit to the body [Leibniz] |
| 19331 | Will is an inclination to pursue something good [Leibniz] |
| 4770 | Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion [Psillos] |
| 19346 | Most people facing death would happily re-live a similar life, with just a bit of variety [Leibniz] |
| 19340 | Metaphysical evil is imperfection; physical evil is suffering; moral evil is sin [Leibniz] |
| 19366 | You can't assess moral actions without referring to the qualities of character that produce them [Leibniz] |
| 13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
| 4399 | Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence [Psillos] |
| 4400 | Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties [Psillos] |
| 4403 | We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round [Psillos] |
| 4789 | Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive [Psillos] |
| 4790 | If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos] |
| 4402 | Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos] |
| 4774 | Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos] |
| 4793 | "All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law [Psillos] |
| 4397 | Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation [Psillos] |
| 4792 | A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts [Psillos] |
| 4801 | The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it [Psillos] |
| 4401 | It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity [Psillos] |
| 4796 | Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities [Psillos] |
| 4799 | Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos] |
| 4780 | In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos] |
| 4791 | Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos] |
| 20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |
| 19326 | God must be intelligible, to select the actual world from the possibilities [Leibniz] |
| 19327 | The intelligent cause must be unique and all-perfect, to handle all the interconnected possibilities [Leibniz] |
| 19344 | God prefers men to lions, but might not exterminate lions to save one man [Leibniz] |
| 19330 | If justice is arbitrary, or fixed but not observed, or not human justice, this undermines God [Leibniz] |
| 19325 | God is the first reason of things; our experiences are contingent, and contain no necessity [Leibniz] |
| 19329 | The laws of physics are wonderful evidence of an intelligent and free being [Leibniz] |
| 19437 | Prayers are useful, because God foresaw them in his great plan [Leibniz] |
| 19337 | How can an all-good, wise and powerful being allow evil, sin and apparent injustice? [Leibniz] |
| 19345 | Being confident of God's goodness, we disregard the apparent local evils in the visible world [Leibniz] |