Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Causality and Properties' and 'Letters to Samuel Clarke'

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50 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
One system has properties, powers, events, similarity and substance [Shoemaker]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction [Shoemaker]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
There is always a reason why things are thus rather than otherwise [Leibniz]
No reason could limit the quantity of matter, so there is no limit [Leibniz]
The principle of sufficient reason is needed if we are to proceed from maths to physics [Leibniz]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / c. Monads
All simply substances are in harmony, because they all represent the one universe [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
The ratio between two lines can't be a feature of one, and cannot be in both [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation [Shoemaker, by Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes [Shoemaker]
Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them [Shoemaker]
To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
We should abandon the idea that properties are the meanings of predicate expressions [Shoemaker]
Some truths are not because of a thing's properties, but because of the properties of related things [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties [Shoemaker]
One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties [Shoemaker]
Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
Shoemaker says all genuine properties are dispositional [Shoemaker, by Ellis]
A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers [Shoemaker]
'Square', 'round' and 'made of copper' show that not all properties are dispositional [Shoemaker]
The identity of a property concerns its causal powers [Shoemaker]
Properties are clusters of conditional powers [Shoemaker]
Could properties change without the powers changing, or powers change without the properties changing? [Shoemaker]
If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination [Shoemaker]
The notions of property and of causal power are parts of a single system of related concepts [Shoemaker]
Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties [Shoemaker]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Universals concern how things are, and how they could be [Shoemaker, by Bird]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same [Shoemaker]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
There is no subset of properties which guarantee a thing's identity [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
Possible difference across worlds depends on difference across time in the actual world [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
'Conceivable' is either not-provably-false, or compatible with what we know? [Shoemaker]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
It is possible to conceive what is not possible [Shoemaker]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential [Shoemaker]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
Atomism is irrational because it suggests that two atoms can be indistinguishable [Leibniz]
Things are infinitely subdivisible and contain new worlds, which atoms would make impossible [Leibniz]
The only simple things are monads, with no parts or extension [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved [Shoemaker]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
If causal laws describe causal potentialities, the same laws govern properties in all possible worlds [Shoemaker]
If properties are causal, then causal necessity is a species of logical necessity [Shoemaker]
If a world has different causal laws, it must have different properties [Shoemaker]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
It looks as if the immutability of the powers of a property imply essentiality [Shoemaker]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / c. Conservation of energy
Leibniz upheld conservations of momentum and energy [Leibniz, by Papineau]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
The idea that the universe could be moved forward with no other change is just a fantasy [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
Space and time are purely relative [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
No time exists except instants, and instants are not even a part of time, so time does not exist [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
If everything in the universe happened a year earlier, there would be no discernible difference [Leibniz]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
If time were absolute that would make God's existence dependent on it [Leibniz, by Bardon]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
The existence of God, and all metaphysics, follows from the Principle of Sufficient Reason [Leibniz]