Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Four Dimensionalism' and 'The Tragedy of Reason'

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47 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
You have to be a Platonist to debate about reality, so every philosopher is a Platonist [Roochnik]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / b. Philosophy as transcendent
Philosophy aims to satisfy the chief human desire - the articulation of beauty itself [Roochnik]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
Metaphysical enquiry can survive if its conclusions are tentative [Sider]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
'Logos' ranges from thought/reasoning, to words, to rational structures outside thought [Roochnik]
In the seventeenth century the only acceptable form of logos was technical knowledge [Roochnik]
The hallmark of a person with logos is that they give reasons why one opinion is superior to another [Roochnik]
Logos cannot refute the relativist, and so must admit that it too is a matter of desire (for truth and agreement) [Roochnik]
Human desire has an ordered structure, with logos at the pinnacle [Roochnik]
Logos is not unconditionally good, but good if there is another person willing to engage with it [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
We prefer reason or poetry according to whether basics are intelligible or not [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
Modern science, by aiming for clarity about the external world, has abandoned rationality in the human world [Roochnik]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Unfortunately for reason, argument can't be used to establish the value of argument [Roochnik]
Attempts to suspend all presuppositions are hopeless, because a common ground must be agreed for the process [Roochnik]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category [Sider]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
Reality can be viewed neutrally, or as an object of desire [Roochnik]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one [Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay [Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts' [Sider]
Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time [Sider]
4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts [Sider]
4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects [Sider]
Temporal parts are instantaneous [Sider]
How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time? [Sider]
Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger [Sider]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
Relativism is a disease which destroys the possibility of rational debate [Roochnik]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
Reasoning aims not at the understanding of objects, but at the desire to give beautiful speeches [Roochnik]
If relativism is the correct account of human values, then rhetoric is more important than reasoning [Roochnik]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Maybe motion is a dynamical quantity intrinsic to a thing at a particular time [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
Space is 3D and lacks a direction; time seems connected to causation [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
Between presentism and eternalism is the 'growing block' view - the past is real, the future is not [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
Presentists must deny truths about multiple times [Sider]
For Presentists there must always be a temporal vantage point for any description [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
Talk using tenses can be eliminated, by reducing it to indexical connections for an utterance [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present [Sider]
The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense [Sider]