Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo' and 'Penses'

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33 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
We are coerced into assent to a truth by reason's violence [Aquinas]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
The mind is compelled by necessary truths, but not by contingent truths [Aquinas]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
The heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing [Pascal]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
For the mind Good is one truth among many, and Truth is one good among many [Aquinas]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
The first principles of truth are not rational, but are known by the heart [Pascal]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Knowledge may be based on senses, but we needn't sense all our knowledge [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
If we saw something as totally and utterly good, we would be compelled to will it [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
Nothing can be willed except what is good, but good is very varied, and so choices are unpredictable [Aquinas]
However habituated you are, given time to ponder you can go against a habit [Aquinas]
Since will is a reasoning power, it can entertain opposites, so it is not compelled to embrace one of them [Aquinas]
The will is not compelled to move, even if pleasant things are set before it [Aquinas]
Because the will moves by examining alternatives, it doesn't compel itself to will [Aquinas]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
We must admit that when the will is not willing something, the first movement to will must come from outside the will [Aquinas]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
We only want to know things so that we can talk about them [Pascal]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / a. Will to Act
The will must aim at happiness, but can choose the means [Aquinas]
We don't have to will even perfect good, because we can choose not to think of it [Aquinas]
The will can only want what it thinks is good [Aquinas]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 3. Artistic Representation
Painting makes us admire things of which we do not admire the originals [Pascal]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Without free will not only is ethical action meaningless, but also planning, commanding, praising and blaming [Aquinas]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / j. Ethics by convention
It is a funny sort of justice whose limits are marked by a river [Pascal]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / d. Subjective value
Imagination creates beauty, justice and happiness, which is the supreme good [Pascal]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Good applies to goals, just as truth applies to ideas in the mind [Aquinas]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
We live for the past or future, and so are never happy in the present [Pascal]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
If man considers himself as lost and imprisoned in the universe, he will be terrified [Pascal]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
Majority opinion is visible and authoritative, although not very clever [Pascal]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
It is not good to be too free [Pascal]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Even a sufficient cause doesn't compel its effect, because interference could interrupt the process [Aquinas]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / d. Time as measure
Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / d. Pascal's Wager
Pascal knows you can't force belief, but you can make it much more probable [Pascal, by Hacking]
Pascal is right, but relies on the unsupported claim of a half as the chance of God's existence [Hacking on Pascal]
The libertine would lose a life of enjoyable sin if he chose the cloisters [Hacking on Pascal]
If you win the wager on God's existence you win everything, if you lose you lose nothing [Pascal]