22 ideas
14352 | '¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson] |
14360 | Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson] |
14353 | Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson] |
14354 | When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson] |
14355 | (A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson] |
14358 | In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson] |
14359 | Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson] |
14357 | Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson] |
14356 | We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson] |
19527 | We don't acquire evidence and then derive some knowledge, because evidence IS knowledge [Williamson] |
19528 | Knowledge is prior to believing, just as doing is prior to trying to do [Williamson] |
19529 | Belief explains justification, and knowledge explains belief, so knowledge explains justification [Williamson] |
19530 | A neutral state of experience, between error and knowledge, is not basic; the successful state is basic [Williamson] |
19531 | Internalism about mind is an obsolete view, and knowledge-first epistemology develops externalism [Williamson] |
19536 | Knowledge-first says your total evidence IS your knowledge [Williamson] |
19526 | Surely I am acquainted with physical objects, not with appearances? [Williamson] |
19534 | How does inferentialism distinguish the patterns of inference that are essential to meaning? [Williamson] |
19535 | Internalist inferentialism has trouble explaining how meaning and reference relate [Williamson] |
19533 | Inferentialist semantics relies on internal inference relations, not on external references [Williamson] |
19532 | Truth-conditional referential semantics is externalist, referring to worldly items [Williamson] |
13304 | Learned men gain more in one day than others do in a lifetime [Posidonius] |
20820 | Time is an interval of motion, or the measure of speed [Posidonius, by Stobaeus] |