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All the ideas for 'Commentary on Euclid's 'Elements'', 'Foundations without Foundationalism' and 'The Trouble with Being Born'

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69 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
So-called wisdom is just pondering things instead of acting [Cioran]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Systems are the worst despotism, in philosophy and in life [Cioran]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
A text explained ceases to be a text [Cioran]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
Satisfaction is 'truth in a model', which is a model of 'truth' [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
Aristotelian logic is complete [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / a. Types of set
A set is 'transitive' if contains every member of each of its members [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
Choice is essential for proving downward Löwenheim-Skolem [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
Are sets part of logic, or part of mathematics? [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
It is central to the iterative conception that membership is well-founded, with no infinite descending chains [Shapiro]
Russell's paradox shows that there are classes which are not iterative sets [Shapiro]
Iterative sets are not Boolean; the complement of an iterative set is not an iterative sets [Shapiro]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
'Well-ordering' of a set is an irreflexive, transitive, and binary relation with a least element [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
There is no 'correct' logic for natural languages [Shapiro]
Logic is the ideal for learning new propositions on the basis of others [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
Bernays (1918) formulated and proved the completeness of propositional logic [Shapiro]
Can one develop set theory first, then derive numbers, or are numbers more basic? [Shapiro]
Skolem and Gödel championed first-order, and Zermelo, Hilbert, and Bernays championed higher-order [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
First-order logic was an afterthought in the development of modern logic [Shapiro]
The 'triumph' of first-order logic may be related to logicism and the Hilbert programme, which failed [Shapiro]
Maybe compactness, semantic effectiveness, and the Löwenheim-Skolem properties are desirable [Shapiro]
The notion of finitude is actually built into first-order languages [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 7. Second-Order Logic
Second-order logic is better than set theory, since it only adds relations and operations, and nothing else [Shapiro, by Lavine]
Broad standard semantics, or Henkin semantics with a subclass, or many-sorted first-order semantics? [Shapiro]
Henkin semantics has separate variables ranging over the relations and over the functions [Shapiro]
In standard semantics for second-order logic, a single domain fixes the ranges for the variables [Shapiro]
Completeness, Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem fail in second-order standard semantics [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
Semantic consequence is ineffective in second-order logic [Shapiro]
If a logic is incomplete, its semantic consequence relation is not effective [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Finding the logical form of a sentence is difficult, and there are no criteria of correctness [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
Negation doesn't arise from reasoning, but from deep instincts [Cioran]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
We might reduce ontology by using truth of sentences and terms, instead of using objects satisfying models [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
'Satisfaction' is a function from models, assignments, and formulas to {true,false} [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Semantics for models uses set-theory [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 2. Isomorphisms
An axiomatization is 'categorical' if its models are isomorphic, so there is really only one interpretation [Shapiro]
Categoricity can't be reached in a first-order language [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 3. Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems
Downward Löwenheim-Skolem: each satisfiable countable set always has countable models [Shapiro]
Upward Löwenheim-Skolem: each infinite model has infinite models of all sizes [Shapiro]
The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show an explosion of infinite models, so 1st-order is useless for infinity [Shapiro]
Substitutional semantics only has countably many terms, so Upward Löwenheim-Skolem trivially fails [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
'Weakly sound' if every theorem is a logical truth; 'sound' if every deduction is a semantic consequence [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
We can live well without completeness in logic [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Non-compactness is a strength of second-order logic, enabling characterisation of infinite structures [Shapiro]
Compactness is derived from soundness and completeness [Shapiro]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 9. Expressibility
A language is 'semantically effective' if its logical truths are recursively enumerable [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Complex numbers can be defined as reals, which are defined as rationals, then integers, then naturals [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
Only higher-order languages can specify that 0,1,2,... are all the natural numbers that there are [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / e. Ordinal numbers
Natural numbers are the finite ordinals, and integers are equivalence classes of pairs of finite ordinals [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / g. Continuum Hypothesis
The 'continuum' is the cardinality of the powerset of a denumerably infinite set [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 4. Axioms for Number / d. Peano arithmetic
First-order arithmetic can't even represent basic number theory [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Some sets of natural numbers are definable in set-theory but not in arithmetic [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Logicism is distinctive in seeking a universal language, and denying that logic is a series of abstractions [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Mathematics and logic have no border, and logic must involve mathematics and its ontology [Shapiro]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 10. Constructivism / d. Predicativism
Some reject formal properties if they are not defined, or defined impredicatively [Shapiro]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / i. Deflating being
The word 'being' is very tempting, but in fact means nothing at all [Cioran]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
People who really believe anti-realism don't bother to prove it [Cioran]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Properties are often seen as intensional; equiangular and equilateral are different, despite identity of objects [Shapiro]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Opinions are fine, but having convictions means something has gone wrong [Cioran]
Convictions are failures to study anything thoroughly [Cioran]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
Geometrical proofs do not show causes, as when we prove a triangle contains two right angles [Proclus]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
If people always acted without words we would take them for robots [Cioran]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / a. Concepts and language
If only we could write like a reptile, of endless sensations and no concepts! [Cioran]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
The origin of geometry started in sensation, then moved to calculation, and then to reason [Proclus]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
We could only be responsible if we had consented before birth to who we are [Cioran]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 6. The Sublime
We morally dissolve if we spend time with excessive beauty [Cioran]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 3. Angst
In anxiety people cling to what reinforces it, because it is a deep need [Cioran]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
Fear cures boredom, because it is stronger [Cioran]
It is better to watch the hours pass, than trying to fill them [Cioran]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
Suicide is pointless, because it always comes too late [Cioran]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / d. Heaven
The first man obviously found paradise unendurable [Cioran]