Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Man (lost)', 'Truth Rehabilitated' and 'Maxims'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
To try to be wise all on one's own is folly [Rochefoucauld]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson]
Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson]
Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / e. Facts rejected
If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 2. Unconscious Mind
La Rochefoucauld's idea of disguised self-love implies an unconscious mind [Rochefoucauld, by Sartre]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 6. Meaning as Use
It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
Contradiction is impossible, since only one side of the argument refers to the true facts [Prodicus, by Didymus the Blind]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Judging by effects, love looks more like hatred than friendship [Rochefoucauld]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / e. Good as knowledge
Supreme cleverness is knowledge of the real value of things [Rochefoucauld]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
Realising our future misery is a kind of happiness [Rochefoucauld]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtue doesn't go far without the support of vanity [Rochefoucauld]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / d. Friendship
True friendship is even rarer than true love [Rochefoucauld]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
We are bored by people to whom we ourselves are boring [Rochefoucauld]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
People used to think anything helpful to life was a god, as the Egyptians think the Nile a god [Prodicus]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
He denied the existence of the gods, saying they are just exaltations of things useful for life [Prodicus]
The gods are just personified human benefits [Prodicus]