45 ideas
12780 | We can grasp the wisdom of God a priori [Leibniz] |
15413 | With four tense operators, all complex tenses reduce to fourteen basic cases [Burgess] |
15415 | The temporal Barcan formulas fix what exists, which seems absurd [Burgess] |
15430 | Is classical logic a part of intuitionist logic, or vice versa? [Burgess] |
15431 | It is still unsettled whether standard intuitionist logic is complete [Burgess] |
15429 | Relevance logic's → is perhaps expressible by 'if A, then B, for that reason' [Burgess] |
15404 | Technical people see logic as any formal system that can be studied, not a study of argument validity [Burgess] |
15405 | Classical logic neglects the non-mathematical, such as temporality or modality [Burgess] |
15427 | The Cut Rule expresses the classical idea that entailment is transitive [Burgess] |
15421 | Classical logic neglects counterfactuals, temporality and modality, because maths doesn't use them [Burgess] |
15403 | Philosophical logic is a branch of logic, and is now centred in computer science [Burgess] |
15407 | Formalising arguments favours lots of connectives; proving things favours having very few [Burgess] |
15424 | Asserting a disjunction from one disjunct seems odd, but can be sensible, and needed in maths [Burgess] |
15409 | All occurrences of variables in atomic formulas are free [Burgess] |
15414 | The denotation of a definite description is flexible, rather than rigid [Burgess] |
15406 | 'Induction' and 'recursion' on complexity prove by connecting a formula to its atomic components [Burgess] |
15425 | The sequent calculus makes it possible to have proof without transitivity of entailment [Burgess] |
15426 | We can build one expanding sequence, instead of a chain of deductions [Burgess] |
15408 | 'Tautologies' are valid formulas of classical sentential logic - or substitution instances in other logics [Burgess] |
15418 | Validity (for truth) and demonstrability (for proof) have correlates in satisfiability and consistency [Burgess] |
15412 | Models leave out meaning, and just focus on truth values [Burgess] |
15411 | We only need to study mathematical models, since all other models are isomorphic to these [Burgess] |
15416 | We aim to get the technical notion of truth in all models matching intuitive truth in all instances [Burgess] |
15428 | The Liar seems like a truth-value 'gap', but dialethists see it as a 'glut' [Burgess] |
12774 | Without a substantial chain to link monads, they would just be coordinated dreams [Leibniz] |
12777 | Monads do not make a unity unless a substantial chain is added to them [Leibniz] |
12782 | Monads control nothing outside of themselves [Leibniz] |
12778 | There is active and passive power in the substantial chain and in the essence of a composite [Leibniz] |
12783 | Primitive force is what gives a composite its reality [Leibniz] |
12775 | Things seem to be unified if we see duration, position, interaction and connection [Leibniz] |
12776 | Every substance is alive [Leibniz] |
12753 | A substantial bond of powers is needed to unite composites, in addition to monads [Leibniz] |
12781 | A composite substance is a mere aggregate if its essence is just its parts [Leibniz] |
15420 | De re modality seems to apply to objects a concept intended for sentences [Burgess] |
15419 | General consensus is S5 for logical modality of validity, and S4 for proof [Burgess] |
15417 | Logical necessity has two sides - validity and demonstrability - which coincide in classical logic [Burgess] |
12779 | There is a reason why not every possible thing exists [Leibniz] |
15422 | Three conditionals theories: Materialism (material conditional), Idealism (true=assertable), Nihilism (no truth) [Burgess] |
15423 | It is doubtful whether the negation of a conditional has any clear meaning [Burgess] |
12785 | Truth is mutually agreed perception [Leibniz] |
1554 | Contradiction is impossible, since only one side of the argument refers to the true facts [Prodicus, by Didymus the Blind] |
1555 | People used to think anything helpful to life was a god, as the Egyptians think the Nile a god [Prodicus] |
12784 | Allow no more miracles than are necessary [Leibniz] |
535 | The gods are just personified human benefits [Prodicus] |
1543 | He denied the existence of the gods, saying they are just exaltations of things useful for life [Prodicus] |