Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'On Man (lost)', 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2013 ver)' and 'Seven Quodlibets'

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20 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
19125 If we define truth, we can eliminate it [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
19128 If a language cannot name all objects, then satisfaction must be used, instead of unary truth [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
19120 Semantic theories need a powerful metalanguage, typically including set theory [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19127 The T-sentences are deductively weak, and also not deductively conservative [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
19124 A natural theory of truth plays the role of reflection principles, establishing arithmetic's soundness [Halbach/Leigh]
19126 If deflationary truth is not explanatory, truth axioms should be 'conservative', proving nothing new [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 2. FS Truth Axioms
19129 The FS axioms use classical logical, but are not fully consistent [Halbach/Leigh]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 3. KF Truth Axioms
19130 KF is formulated in classical logic, but describes non-classical truth, which allows truth-value gluts [Halbach/Leigh]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 1. Nature of Relations
18529 Relations are expressed either as absolute facts, or by a relational concept [William of Ockham]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 12. Denial of Properties
19121 We can reduce properties to true formulas [Halbach/Leigh]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
19122 Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
16779 Cut wood doesn't make a new substance, but seems to make separate subjects [William of Ockham]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / a. Hylomorphism
16757 Hot water naturally cools down, which is due to the substantial form of the water [William of Ockham]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
9102 If an animal approached from a distance, we might abstract 'animal' from one instance [William of Ockham]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
9114 There are no secure foundations to prove the separate existence of mind, in reason or experience [William of Ockham]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
1554 Contradiction is impossible, since only one side of the argument refers to the true facts [Prodicus, by Didymus the Blind]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / c. Teleological Proof critique
1555 People used to think anything helpful to life was a god, as the Egyptians think the Nile a god [Prodicus]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
535 The gods are just personified human benefits [Prodicus]
1543 He denied the existence of the gods, saying they are just exaltations of things useful for life [Prodicus]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
9115 To love God means to love whatever God wills to be loved [William of Ockham]