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All the ideas for 'reports', 'The Consolations of Philosophy' and 'Person and Object'

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70 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
He studied philosophy by suspending his judgement on everything [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Many philosophers aim to understand metaphysics by studying ourselves [Chisholm]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
I use variables to show that each item remains the same entity throughout [Chisholm]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Sceptics say reason is only an instrument, because reason can only be attacked with reason [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Events are states of affairs that occur at certain places and times [Chisholm]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 9. States of Affairs
I propose that events and propositions are two types of states of affairs [Chisholm]
The mark of a state of affairs is that it is capable of being accepted [Chisholm]
A state of affairs pertains to a thing if it implies that it has some property [Chisholm]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Some properties, such as 'being a widow', can be seen as 'rooted outside the time they are had' [Chisholm]
Some properties can never be had, like being a round square [Chisholm]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
If some dogs are brown, that entails the properties of 'being brown' and 'being canine' [Chisholm]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
Maybe we can only individuate things by relating them to ourselves [Chisholm]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
Being the tallest man is an 'individual concept', but not a haecceity [Chisholm]
A haecceity is a property had necessarily, and strictly confined to one entity [Chisholm]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 7. Substratum
A peach is sweet and fuzzy, but it doesn't 'have' those qualities [Chisholm]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
If x is ever part of y, then y is necessarily such that x is part of y at any time that y exists [Chisholm, by Simons]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
A traditional individual essence includes all of a thing's necessary characteristics [Chisholm]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 7. Intermittent Objects
Intermittence is seen in a toy fort, which is dismantled then rebuilt with the same bricks [Chisholm, by Simons]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
The property of being identical with me is an individual concept [Chisholm]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
There is 'loose' identity between things if their properties, or truths about them, might differ [Chisholm]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Reasoning relates to understanding as time does to eternity [Boethius, by Sorabji]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / d. Sense-data problems
Do sense-data have structure, location, weight, and constituting matter? [Chisholm]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
'I feel depressed' is more like 'he runs slowly' than like 'he has a red book' [Chisholm]
If we can say a man senses 'redly', why not also 'rectangularly'? [Chisholm]
So called 'sense-data' are best seen as 'modifications' of the person experiencing them [Chisholm]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
The Pyrrhonians attacked the dogmas of professors, not ordinary people [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Academics said that Pyrrhonians were guilty of 'negative dogmatism' [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Judgements vary according to local culture and law (Mode 5) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Animals vary in their feelings and judgements (Mode 1) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Perception varies with madness or disease (Mode 4) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Perception of things depends on their size or quantity (Mode 8) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Perception of objects depends on surrounding conditions (Mode 6) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Perception is affected by expectations (Mode 9) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Objects vary according to which sense perceives them (Mode 3) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Perception varies with viewing distance and angle (Mode 7) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Perception and judgement depend on comparison (Mode 10) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Individuals vary in responses and feelings (Mode 2) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Explanations have states of affairs as their objects [Chisholm]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
I am picked out uniquely by my individual essence, which is 'being identical with myself' [Chisholm]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Sartre says the ego is 'opaque'; I prefer to say that it is 'transparent' [Chisholm]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 3. Reference of 'I'
People use 'I' to refer to themselves, with the meaning of their own individual essence [Chisholm]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 1. Self as Indeterminate
Bad theories of the self see it as abstract, or as a bundle, or as a process [Chisholm]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Knowledge of present events doesn't make them necessary, so future events are no different [Boethius]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Rational natures require free will, in order to have power of judgement [Boethius]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
Determinism claims that every event has a sufficient causal pre-condition [Chisholm]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Does foreknowledge cause necessity, or necessity cause foreknowledge? [Boethius]
God's universal foreknowledge seems opposed to free will [Boethius]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
The wicked want goodness, so they would not be wicked if they obtained it [Boethius]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
There are mere omissions (through ignorance, perhaps), and people can 'commit an omission' [Chisholm]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Rewards and punishments are not deserved if they don't arise from free movement of the mind [Boethius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature [Boethius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing more to be desired [Boethius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The bad seek the good through desire, but the good through virtue, which is more natural [Boethius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Varied aims cannot be good because they differ, but only become good when they unify [Boethius]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
You can't control someone's free mind, only their body and possessions [Boethius]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
The concept of physical necessity is basic to both causation, and to the concept of nature [Chisholm]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Some propose a distinct 'agent causation', as well as 'event causation' [Chisholm]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
There are no causes, because they are relative, and alike things can't cause one another [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
A 'law of nature' is just something which is physically necessary [Chisholm]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Motion can't move where it is, and can't move where it isn't, so it can't exist [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
Divine eternity is the all-at-once and complete possession of unending life [Boethius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Where does evil come from if there is a god; where does good come from if there isn't? [Boethius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
God is the good [Boethius]
God is the supreme good, so no source of goodness could take precedence over God [Boethius]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
The power through which creation remains in existence and motion I call 'God' [Boethius]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The regular events of this life could never be due to chance [Boethius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The reward of the good is to become gods [Boethius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
God can do anything, but he cannot do evil, so evil must be nothing [Boethius]
If you could see the plan of Providence, you would not think there was evil anywhere [Boethius]