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All the ideas for 'reports', 'Powers' and 'works'

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57 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
He studied philosophy by suspending his judgement on everything [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Substantive metaphysics says what a property is, not what a predicate means [Molnar]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Sceptics say reason is only an instrument, because reason can only be attacked with reason [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
A real definition gives all the properties that constitute an identity [Molnar]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Zermelo made 'set' and 'member' undefined axioms [Zermelo, by Chihara]
For Zermelo's set theory the empty set is zero and the successor of each number is its unit set [Zermelo, by Blackburn]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 4. Ontological Dependence
Ontological dependence rests on essential connection, not necessary connection [Molnar]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
The three categories in ontology are objects, properties and relations [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / a. Types of relation
Reflexive relations are syntactically polyadic but ontologically monadic [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
If atomism is true, then all properties derive from ultimate properties [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
'Being physical' is a second-order property [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
'Categorical properties' are those which are not powers [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 1. Powers
A power's type-identity is given by its definitive manifestation [Molnar]
Powers have Directedness, Independence, Actuality, Intrinsicality and Objectivity [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
The physical world has a feature very like mental intentionality [Molnar]
Dispositions and external powers arise entirely from intrinsic powers in objects [Molnar]
Some powers are ungrounded, and others rest on them, and are derivative [Molnar]
The Standard Model suggest that particles are entirely dispositional, and hence are powers [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / a. Dispositions
Dispositions can be causes, so they must be part of the actual world [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
If powers only exist when actual, they seem to be nomadic, and indistinguishable from non-powers [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
Platonic explanations of universals actually diminish our understanding [Molnar]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
For nominalists, predicate extensions are inexplicable facts [Molnar]
Nominalists only accept first-order logic [Molnar]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
Structural properties are derivate properties [Molnar]
There are no 'structural properties', as properties with parts [Molnar]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / b. Essence not necessities
The essence of a thing need not include everything that is necessarily true of it [Molnar]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
What is the truthmaker for a non-existent possible? [Molnar]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
The Pyrrhonians attacked the dogmas of professors, not ordinary people [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Academics said that Pyrrhonians were guilty of 'negative dogmatism' [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Perception of things depends on their size or quantity (Mode 8) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Individuals vary in responses and feelings (Mode 2) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Perception varies with viewing distance and angle (Mode 7) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Animals vary in their feelings and judgements (Mode 1) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Objects vary according to which sense perceives them (Mode 3) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Perception of objects depends on surrounding conditions (Mode 6) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Perception varies with madness or disease (Mode 4) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Perception and judgement depend on comparison (Mode 10) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Judgements vary according to local culture and law (Mode 5) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Perception is affected by expectations (Mode 9) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / a. Explanation
Hume allows interpolation, even though it and extrapolation are not actually valid [Molnar]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / a. Mind
The two ways proposed to distinguish mind are intentionality or consciousness [Molnar]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Physical powers like solubility and charge also have directedness [Molnar]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 4. Occasionalism
Rule occasionalism says God's actions follow laws, not miracles [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 2. Types of cause
Singular causation is prior to general causation; each aspirin produces the aspirin generalization [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 4. Naturalised causation
We should analyse causation in terms of powers, not vice versa [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
There are no causes, because they are relative, and alike things can't cause one another [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
We should analyse causation in terms of powers [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
Causal dependence explains counterfactual dependence, not vice versa [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Science works when we assume natural kinds have essences - because it is true [Molnar]
Location in space and time are non-power properties [Molnar, by Mumford]
One essential property of a muon doesn't entail the others [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
The laws of nature depend on the powers, not the other way round [Molnar]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Motion can't move where it is, and can't move where it isn't, so it can't exist [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 2. Electrodynamics / b. Fields
Energy fields are discontinuous at the very small [Molnar]