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All the ideas for 'reports', 'fragments/reports' and 'Truthmakers'

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41 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
1798 He studied philosophy by suspending his judgement on everything [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
1800 Sceptics say reason is only an instrument, because reason can only be attacked with reason [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
18486 We might define truth as arising from the truth-maker relation [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18484 Phenomenalists, behaviourists and presentists can't supply credible truth-makers [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 2. Truthmaker Relation
18466 If truthmaking is classical entailment, then anything whatsoever makes a necessary truth [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism
18481 Maximalism follows Russell, and optimalism (no negative or universal truthmakers) follows Wittgenstein [MacBride]
18473 'Maximalism' says every truth has an actual truthmaker [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / a. What makes truths
18483 The main idea of truth-making is that what a proposition is about is what matters [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 6. Making Negative Truths
18479 There are different types of truthmakers for different types of negative truth [MacBride]
18477 There aren't enough positive states out there to support all the negative truths [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 8. Making General Truths
18482 Optimalists say that negative and universal are true 'by default' from the positive truths [MacBride]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
18485 Even idealists could accept truthmakers, as mind-dependent [MacBride]
18474 Does 'this sentence has no truth-maker' have a truth-maker? Reductio suggests it can't have [MacBride]
18490 Maybe 'makes true' is not an active verb, but just a formal connective like 'because'? [MacBride]
18493 Truthmaker talk of 'something' making sentences true, which presupposes objectual quantification [MacBride]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
18489 Connectives link sentences without linking their meanings [MacBride]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / c. not
18476 'A is F' may not be positive ('is dead'), and 'A is not-F' may not be negative ('is not blind') [MacBride]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
12270 Being is one [Melissus, by Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
18480 Maybe it only exists if it is a truthmaker (rather than the value of a variable)? [MacBride]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
18471 Different types of 'grounding' seem to have no more than a family resemblance relation [MacBride]
18472 Which has priority - 'grounding' or 'truth-making'? [MacBride]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 6. Fundamentals / d. Logical atoms
18475 Russell allows some complex facts, but Wittgenstein only allows atomic facts [MacBride]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
18478 Wittgenstein's plan to show there is only logical necessity failed, because of colours [MacBride]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
6595 If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
6593 The Pyrrhonians attacked the dogmas of professors, not ordinary people [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
6592 Academics said that Pyrrhonians were guilty of 'negative dogmatism' [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
1808 Perception of things depends on their size or quantity (Mode 8) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1802 Individuals vary in responses and feelings (Mode 2) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1807 Perception varies with viewing distance and angle (Mode 7) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1801 Animals vary in their feelings and judgements (Mode 1) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1804 Perception varies with madness or disease (Mode 4) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1810 Perception and judgement depend on comparison (Mode 10) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1805 Judgements vary according to local culture and law (Mode 5) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1809 Perception is affected by expectations (Mode 9) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1803 Objects vary according to which sense perceives them (Mode 3) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1806 Perception of objects depends on surrounding conditions (Mode 6) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
3062 There are no causes, because they are relative, and alike things can't cause one another [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
3059 There is no real motion, only the appearance of it [Melissus, by Diog. Laertius]
3063 Motion can't move where it is, and can't move where it isn't, so it can't exist [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
5100 The void is not required for change, because a plenum can alter in quality [Aristotle on Melissus]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 2. Eternal Universe
456 Nothing could come out of nothing [Melissus]