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All the ideas for 'reports', 'The Structure of Appearance' and 'The Moral Problem'

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43 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
1798 He studied philosophy by suspending his judgement on everything [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
23728 Analysis aims to express the full set of platitudes surrounding a given concept [Smith,M]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
1800 Sceptics say reason is only an instrument, because reason can only be attacked with reason [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
23744 Defining a set of things by paradigms doesn't pin them down enough [Smith,M]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
15510 Classes are a host of ethereal, platonic, pseudo entities [Goodman]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
9920 Two objects can apparently make up quite distinct arrangements in sets [Goodman, by Burgess/Rosen]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
10657 The counties of Utah, and the state, and its acres, are in no way different [Goodman]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
7956 If all and only red things were round things, we would need to specify the 'respect' of the resemblance [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
7957 Without respects of resemblance, we would collect blue book, blue pen, red pen, red clock together [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
7952 If we apply the same word to different things, it is only because we are willing to do so [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
6595 If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
6593 The Pyrrhonians attacked the dogmas of professors, not ordinary people [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
6592 Academics said that Pyrrhonians were guilty of 'negative dogmatism' [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
1808 Perception of things depends on their size or quantity (Mode 8) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1801 Animals vary in their feelings and judgements (Mode 1) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1804 Perception varies with madness or disease (Mode 4) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1810 Perception and judgement depend on comparison (Mode 10) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1805 Judgements vary according to local culture and law (Mode 5) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1809 Perception is affected by expectations (Mode 9) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1803 Objects vary according to which sense perceives them (Mode 3) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1806 Perception of objects depends on surrounding conditions (Mode 6) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1802 Individuals vary in responses and feelings (Mode 2) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1807 Perception varies with viewing distance and angle (Mode 7) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
23743 Capturing all the common sense facts about rationality is almost impossible [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 1. Acting on Desires
23723 In the Humean account, desires are not true/false, or subject to any rational criticism [Smith,M]
23735 Subjects may be fallible about the desires which explain their actions [Smith,M]
23736 A person can have a desire without feeling it [Smith,M]
23739 Goals need desires, and so only desires can motivate us [Smith,M]
23738 Humeans (unlike their opponents) say that desires and judgements can separate [Smith,M]
23742 If first- and second-order desires conflict, harmony does not require the second-order to win [Smith,M]
23746 Objective reasons to act might be the systematic desires of a fully rational person [Smith,M]
23724 A pure desire could be criticised if it were based on a false belief [Smith,M]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
23733 Motivating reasons are psychological, while normative reasons are external [Smith,M]
23740 Humeans take maximising desire satisfaction as the normative reasons for actions [Smith,M]
23745 We cannot expect even fully rational people to converge on having the same desires for action [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
23731 'Externalists' say moral judgements are not reasons, and maybe not even motives [Smith,M]
23732 A person could make a moral judgement without being in any way motivated by it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
23729 Moral internalism says a judgement of rightness is thereby motivating [Smith,M]
23730 'Rationalism' says the rightness of an action is a reason to perform it [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
23727 Expressivists count attitudes as 'moral' if they concern features of things, rather than their mere existence [Smith,M]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
23741 Is valuing something a matter of believing or a matter of desiring? [Smith,M]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
3062 There are no causes, because they are relative, and alike things can't cause one another [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
3063 Motion can't move where it is, and can't move where it isn't, so it can't exist [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]