36 ideas
| 1798 | He studied philosophy by suspending his judgement on everything [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1800 | Sceptics say reason is only an instrument, because reason can only be attacked with reason [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 22462 | We should speak the truth, but also preserve and pursue it [Foot] |
| 19108 | Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak] |
| 19094 | For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak] |
| 19105 | Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak] |
| 19100 | Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak] |
| 19099 | 'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak] |
| 19103 | 'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak] |
| 19101 | Disquotation is bivalent [Misak] |
| 19096 | Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak] |
| 19106 | Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak] |
| 19098 | Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak] |
| 19104 | Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak] |
| 19109 | The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak] |
| 6595 | If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
| 6593 | The Pyrrhonians attacked the dogmas of professors, not ordinary people [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
| 6592 | Academics said that Pyrrhonians were guilty of 'negative dogmatism' [Pyrrho, by Fogelin] |
| 1805 | Judgements vary according to local culture and law (Mode 5) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1803 | Objects vary according to which sense perceives them (Mode 3) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1807 | Perception varies with viewing distance and angle (Mode 7) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1810 | Perception and judgement depend on comparison (Mode 10) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1802 | Individuals vary in responses and feelings (Mode 2) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1801 | Animals vary in their feelings and judgements (Mode 1) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1804 | Perception varies with madness or disease (Mode 4) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1808 | Perception of things depends on their size or quantity (Mode 8) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1806 | Perception of objects depends on surrounding conditions (Mode 6) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 1809 | Perception is affected by expectations (Mode 9) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 22458 | Consequentialists can hurt the innocent in order to prevent further wickedness [Foot] |
| 22460 | Why might we think that a state of affairs can be morally good or bad? [Foot] |
| 22461 | Good outcomes are not external guides to morality, but a part of virtuous actions [Foot] |
| 22464 | The idea of a good state of affairs has no role in the thought of Aristotle, Rawls or Scanlon [Foot] |
| 22463 | Morality is seen as tacit legislation by the community [Foot] |
| 22459 | For consequentialism, it is irrational to follow a rule which in this instance ends badly [Foot] |
| 3062 | There are no causes, because they are relative, and alike things can't cause one another [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 3063 | Motion can't move where it is, and can't move where it isn't, so it can't exist [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius] |