Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'talk', 'Truth by Convention' and 'Dialogue on human freedom and origin of evil'

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31 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
He studied philosophy by suspending his judgement on everything [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 6. Logical Analysis
If if time is money then if time is not money then time is money then if if if time is not money... [Quine]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Sceptics say reason is only an instrument, because reason can only be attacked with reason [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
Definition by words is determinate but relative; fixing contexts could make it absolute [Quine]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
Quine quickly dismisses If-thenism [Quine, by Musgrave]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 4. Logic by Convention
Logic needs general conventions, but that needs logic to apply them to individual cases [Quine, by Rey]
Claims that logic and mathematics are conventional are either empty, uninteresting, or false [Quine]
Logic isn't conventional, because logic is needed to infer logic from conventions [Quine]
If a convention cannot be communicated until after its adoption, what is its role? [Quine]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Circles must be bounded, so cannot be infinite [Leibniz]
If analytic geometry identifies figures with arithmetical relations, logicism can include geometry [Quine]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
There are four different possible conventional accounts of geometry [Quine]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
If mathematics follows from definitions, then it is conventional, and part of logic [Quine]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
If we need a criterion of truth, we need to know whether it is the correct criterion [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
The Pyrrhonians attacked the dogmas of professors, not ordinary people [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
Academics said that Pyrrhonians were guilty of 'negative dogmatism' [Pyrrho, by Fogelin]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Judgements vary according to local culture and law (Mode 5) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Objects vary according to which sense perceives them (Mode 3) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Perception varies with viewing distance and angle (Mode 7) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Perception and judgement depend on comparison (Mode 10) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Individuals vary in responses and feelings (Mode 2) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Animals vary in their feelings and judgements (Mode 1) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Perception varies with madness or disease (Mode 4) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Perception of things depends on their size or quantity (Mode 8) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Perception of objects depends on surrounding conditions (Mode 6) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
Perception is affected by expectations (Mode 9) [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
Sloth's Syllogism: either it can't happen, or it is inevitable without my effort [Leibniz]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 7. Eliminating causation
There are no causes, because they are relative, and alike things can't cause one another [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
Motion can't move where it is, and can't move where it isn't, so it can't exist [Pyrrho, by Diog. Laertius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
Evil is a negation of good, which arises from non-being [Leibniz]
God only made sin possible because a much greater good can be derived from it [Leibniz]