76 ideas
19674 | The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux] |
19648 | Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux] |
19657 | In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux] |
19675 | Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux] |
19649 | Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux] |
19666 | If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux] |
19656 | Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux] |
19664 | Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux] |
19663 | We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux] |
19665 | Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux] |
4098 | The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane] |
19677 | What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux] |
19659 | The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux] |
19662 | It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux] |
19654 | We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux] |
4077 | Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane] |
4078 | Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane] |
4082 | The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane] |
4083 | If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane] |
4079 | Properties are causes [Crane] |
4068 | Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane] |
19660 | Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux] |
19671 | The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux] |
4096 | Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane] |
4097 | Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane] |
4093 | Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane] |
19651 | Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux] |
19647 | The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux] |
4108 | Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane] |
4104 | One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane] |
4105 | The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane] |
4101 | If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane] |
4102 | The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane] |
4109 | If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane] |
4103 | The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane] |
4065 | Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane] |
19652 | How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux] |
19668 | Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux] |
4092 | The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane] |
4087 | Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane] |
4095 | Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane] |
4106 | If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane] |
4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
4107 | With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane] |
19650 | The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux] |
4069 | Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane] |
4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
4091 | The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane] |
4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
4080 | If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane] |
4085 | Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane] |
4075 | Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane] |
4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
4072 | The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane] |
4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
4100 | The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane] |
4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
4063 | In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane] |
4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
19667 | If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux] |
19670 | Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux] |
21241 | Even the fool can hold 'a being than which none greater exists' in his understanding [Anselm] |
21242 | If that than which a greater cannot be thought actually exists, that is greater than the mere idea [Anselm] |
21244 | Conceiving a greater being than God leads to absurdity [Anselm] |
21243 | An existing thing is even greater if its non-existence is inconceivable [Anselm] |
1421 | A perfection must be independent and unlimited, and the necessary existence of Anselm's second proof gives this [Malcolm on Anselm] |
21245 | The word 'God' can be denied, but understanding shows God must exist [Anselm] |
21246 | Guanilo says a supremely fertile island must exist, just because we can conceive it [Anselm] |
21247 | Nonexistence is impossible for the greatest thinkable thing, which has no beginning or end [Anselm] |
4066 | It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane] |
19653 | The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux] |
1420 | Anselm's first proof fails because existence isn't a real predicate, so it can't be a perfection [Malcolm on Anselm] |
19658 | Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux] |