Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'After Finitude', 'Fourfold Root of Princ of Sufficient Reason' and 'Words without Objects'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

43 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
19648 Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux]
19674 The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 6. Twentieth Century Thought
19657 In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
19675 Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
19649 Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
21918 Sufficient Reason can't be proved, because all proof presupposes it [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
19666 If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
19656 Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 7. Paraconsistency
19664 Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux]
19663 We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux]
19665 Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 4. Variables in Logic
12797 If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
12794 Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
17694 Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock]
17695 Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
19677 What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
19659 The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
19662 It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
19654 We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
12792 The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock]
12799 Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / b. Mixtures
12818 We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
21920 No need for a priori categories, since sufficient reason shows the interrelations [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
12795 Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
21362 Necessity is physical, logical, mathematical or moral [Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
19660 Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
19671 The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
21361 For Schopenhauer, material things would not exist without the mind [Schopenhauer, by Janaway]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
21919 Object for a subject and representation are the same thing [Schopenhauer]
19651 Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
19647 The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
19652 How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
19668 Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
21917 The four explanations: objects by causes, concepts by ground, maths by spacetime, ethics by motive [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
17696 'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
19650 The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / b. Empirical concepts
21921 Concepts are abstracted from perceptions [Schopenhauer, by Lewis,PB]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
12791 It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
21363 Motivation is causality seen from within [Schopenhauer]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
19667 If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux]
19670 Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
19653 The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
19658 Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux]