56 ideas
12104 | All ideas must be understood historically [Comte] |
12105 | Our knowledge starts in theology, passes through metaphysics, and ends in positivism [Comte] |
19648 | Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux] |
19674 | The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux] |
19657 | In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux] |
12112 | Metaphysics is just the oversubtle qualification of abstract names for phenomena [Comte] |
12111 | Positivism is the final state of human intelligence [Comte] |
12106 | Positivism gives up absolute truth, and seeks phenomenal laws, by reason and observation [Comte] |
12114 | Science can drown in detail, so we need broad scientists (to keep out the metaphysicians) [Comte] |
12116 | Only positivist philosophy can terminate modern social crises [Comte] |
19675 | Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux] |
19649 | Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux] |
19666 | If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux] |
19656 | Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux] |
19663 | We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux] |
19664 | Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux] |
19665 | Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux] |
10888 | Sets can be defined by 'enumeration', or by 'abstraction' (based on a property) [Zalabardo] |
10889 | The 'Cartesian Product' of two sets relates them by pairing every element with every element [Zalabardo] |
10890 | A 'partial ordering' is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive [Zalabardo] |
10886 | Determinacy: an object is either in a set, or it isn't [Zalabardo] |
10887 | Specification: Determinate totals of objects always make a set [Zalabardo] |
10897 | A first-order 'sentence' is a formula with no free variables [Zalabardo] |
10893 | Γ |= φ for sentences if φ is true when all of Γ is true [Zalabardo] |
10899 | Γ |= φ if φ is true when all of Γ is true, for all structures and interpretations [Zalabardo] |
10896 | Propositional logic just needs ¬, and one of ∧, ∨ and → [Zalabardo] |
10898 | The semantics shows how truth values depend on instantiations of properties and relations [Zalabardo] |
10902 | We can do semantics by looking at given propositions, or by building new ones [Zalabardo] |
10892 | We make a truth assignment to T and F, which may be true and false, but merely differ from one another [Zalabardo] |
10900 | Logically true sentences are true in all structures [Zalabardo] |
10895 | 'Logically true' (|= φ) is true for every truth-assignment [Zalabardo] |
10901 | Some formulas are 'satisfiable' if there is a structure and interpretation that makes them true [Zalabardo] |
10894 | A sentence-set is 'satisfiable' if at least one truth-assignment makes them all true [Zalabardo] |
10903 | A structure models a sentence if it is true in the model, and a set of sentences if they are all true in the model [Zalabardo] |
19677 | What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux] |
10891 | If a set is defined by induction, then proof by induction can be applied to it [Zalabardo] |
19659 | The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux] |
19662 | It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux] |
19654 | We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux] |
19660 | Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux] |
19671 | The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux] |
19651 | Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux] |
19647 | The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux] |
12108 | All real knowledge rests on observed facts [Comte] |
12109 | We must observe in order to form theories, but connected observations need prior theories [Comte] |
19652 | How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux] |
19668 | Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux] |
12107 | Positivism explains facts by connecting particular phenomena with general facts [Comte] |
19650 | The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux] |
12115 | Introspection is pure illusion; we can obviously observe everything except ourselves [Comte] |
12113 | The search for first or final causes is futile [Comte] |
19667 | If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux] |
19670 | Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux] |
12110 | We can never know origins, purposes or inner natures [Comte] |
19653 | The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux] |
19658 | Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux] |