43 ideas
19648 | Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux] |
19674 | The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux] |
19657 | In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux] |
23025 | Philosophers should be more inductive, and test results by their conclusions, not their self-evidence [Russell] |
19675 | Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux] |
19649 | Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux] |
19666 | If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux] |
19656 | Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux] |
19215 | Arguers often turn the opponent's modus ponens into their own modus tollens [Merricks] |
19205 | 'Snow is white' only contingently expresses the proposition that snow is white [Merricks] |
19209 | Simple Quantified Modal Logc doesn't work, because the Converse Barcan is a theorem [Merricks] |
19208 | The Converse Barcan implies 'everything exists necessarily' is a consequence of 'necessarily, everything exists' [Merricks] |
19664 | Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux] |
19665 | Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux] |
19663 | We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux] |
19207 | Sentence logic maps truth values; predicate logic maps objects and sets [Merricks] |
19677 | What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux] |
19659 | The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux] |
19662 | It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux] |
19654 | We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux] |
19214 | In twinning, one person has the same origin as another person [Merricks] |
19660 | Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux] |
19671 | The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux] |
19651 | Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux] |
19647 | The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux] |
19652 | How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux] |
19668 | Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux] |
19650 | The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux] |
19217 | I don't accept that if a proposition is directly about an entity, it has a relation to the entity [Merricks] |
19203 | A sentence's truth conditions depend on context [Merricks] |
19200 | Propositions are standardly treated as possible worlds, or as structured [Merricks] |
19206 | 'Cicero is an orator' represents the same situation as 'Tully is an orator', so they are one proposition [Merricks] |
19202 | Propositions are necessary existents which essentially (but inexplicably) represent things [Merricks] |
19204 | True propositions existed prior to their being thought, and might never be thought [Merricks] |
19210 | The standard view of propositions says they never change their truth-value [Merricks] |
19201 | Propositions can be 'about' an entity, but that doesn't make the entity a constituent of it [Merricks] |
19211 | Early Russell says a proposition is identical with its truthmaking state of affairs [Merricks] |
19212 | Unity of the proposition questions: what unites them? can the same constituents make different ones? [Merricks] |
19213 | We want to explain not just what unites the constituents, but what unites them into a proposition [Merricks] |
19667 | If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux] |
19670 | Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux] |
19653 | The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux] |
19658 | Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux] |