54 ideas
19648 | Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux] |
19674 | The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux] |
19657 | In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux] |
15477 | Ontology is highly abstract physics, containing placeholders and exclusions [Martin,CB] |
19675 | Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux] |
19649 | Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux] |
19666 | If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux] |
19656 | Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux] |
15471 | Truth is a relation between a representation ('bearer') and part of the world ('truthmaker') [Martin,CB] |
19663 | We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux] |
19664 | Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux] |
19665 | Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux] |
19677 | What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux] |
19659 | The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux] |
19662 | It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux] |
19654 | We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux] |
15484 | A property is a combination of a disposition and a quality [Martin,CB] |
15478 | Properties are the respects in which objects resemble, which places them in classes [Martin,CB] |
15483 | Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor [Martin,CB] |
15480 | Objects are not bundles of tropes (which are ways things are, not parts of things) [Martin,CB] |
15489 | A property that cannot interact is worse than inert - it isn't there at all [Martin,CB] |
15487 | If unmanifested partnerless dispositions are still real, and are not just qualities, they can explain properties [Martin,CB] |
15479 | Properties endow a ball with qualities, and with powers or dispositions [Martin,CB] |
15488 | Qualities and dispositions are aspects of properties - what it exhibits, and what it does [Martin,CB] |
15469 | Dispositions in action can be destroyed, be recovered, or remain unchanged [Martin,CB] |
15467 | Powers depend on circumstances, so can't be given a conditional analysis [Martin,CB] |
15466 | 'The wire is live' can't be analysed as a conditional, because a wire can change its powers [Martin,CB] |
15476 | Structural properties involve dispositionality, so cannot be used to explain it [Martin,CB] |
15465 | Structures don't explain dispositions, because they consist of dispositions [Martin,CB] |
15481 | I favour the idea of a substratum for properties; spacetime seems to be just a bearer of properties [Martin,CB] |
15474 | Properly understood, wholes do no more causal work than their parts [Martin,CB] |
16157 | Insurance on the original ship would hardly be paid out if the plank version was wrecked! [Frede,M] |
15486 | Only abstract things can have specific and full identity specifications [Martin,CB] |
15475 | The concept of 'identity' must allow for some changes in properties or parts [Martin,CB] |
19660 | Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux] |
19671 | The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux] |
15472 | It is pointless to say possible worlds are truthmakers, and then deny that possible worlds exist [Martin,CB] |
19651 | Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux] |
19647 | The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux] |
19652 | How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux] |
19668 | Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux] |
15492 | Explanations are mind-dependent, theory-laden, and interest-relative [Martin,CB] |
15495 | Analogy works, as when we eat food which others seem to be relishing [Martin,CB] |
15493 | Memory requires abstraction, as reminders of what cannot be fully remembered [Martin,CB] |
19650 | The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux] |
15485 | Instead of a cause followed by an effect, we have dispositions in reciprocal manifestation [Martin,CB] |
15491 | Causation should be explained in terms of dispositions and manifestations [Martin,CB] |
15468 | Causal counterfactuals are just clumsy linguistic attempts to indicate dispositions [Martin,CB] |
19667 | If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux] |
19670 | Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux] |
15470 | Causal laws are summaries of powers [Martin,CB] |
15482 | We can't think of space-time as empty and propertyless, and it seems to be a substratum [Martin,CB] |
19653 | The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux] |
19658 | Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux] |