62 ideas
| 19648 | Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux] |
| 19674 | The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux] |
| 19657 | In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux] |
| 14027 | If we are to use words in enquiry, we need their main, unambiguous and uncontested meanings [Epicurus] |
| 19675 | Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux] |
| 19649 | Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux] |
| 19666 | If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux] |
| 19656 | Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux] |
| 14040 | Observation and applied thought are always true [Epicurus] |
| 19108 | Truth is proper assertion, but that has varying standards [Misak] |
| 19094 | For pragmatists the loftiest idea of truth is just a feature of what remains forever assertible [Misak] |
| 19105 | Truth isn't a grand elusive property, if it is just the aim of our assertions and inquiries [Misak] |
| 19100 | Truth makes disagreements matter, or worth settling [Misak] |
| 19099 | 'True' is used for emphasis, clarity, assertion, comparison, objectivity, meaning, negation, consequence... [Misak] |
| 19103 | 'That's true' doesn't just refer back to a sentence, but implies sustained evidence for it [Misak] |
| 19101 | Disquotation is bivalent [Misak] |
| 19096 | Disquotationalism resembles a telephone directory [Misak] |
| 19106 | Disquotations says truth is assertion, and assertion proclaims truth - but what is 'assertion'? [Misak] |
| 19098 | Deflating the correspondence theory doesn't entail deflating all the other theories [Misak] |
| 19104 | Deflationism isn't a theory of truth, but an account of its role in natural language [Misak] |
| 19663 | We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux] |
| 19664 | Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux] |
| 19665 | Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux] |
| 19677 | What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux] |
| 14028 | Nothing comes to be from what doesn't exist [Epicurus] |
| 14029 | If disappearing things went to nothingness, nothing could return, and it would all be gone by now [Epicurus] |
| 19659 | The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux] |
| 19662 | It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux] |
| 19654 | We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux] |
| 14030 | The totality is complete, so there is no room for it to change, and nothing extraneous to change it [Epicurus] |
| 19109 | The anti-realism debate concerns whether indefeasibility is a plausible aim of inquiry [Misak] |
| 14048 | Astronomical movements are blessed, but they don't need the help of the gods [Epicurus] |
| 14044 | The perceived accidental properties of bodies cannot be conceived of as independent natures [Epicurus] |
| 14045 | Accidental properties give a body its nature, but are not themselves bodies or parts of bodies [Epicurus] |
| 14046 | A 'body' is a conception of an aggregate, with properties defined by application conditions [Epicurus] |
| 14047 | Bodies have impermanent properties, and permanent ones which define its conceived nature [Epicurus] |
| 19660 | Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux] |
| 19671 | The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux] |
| 14039 | Above and below us will never appear to be the same, because it is inconceivable [Epicurus] |
| 14050 | We aim to dissolve our fears, by understanding their causes [Epicurus] |
| 19651 | Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux] |
| 14037 | Atoms only have shape, weight and size, and the properties which accompany shape [Epicurus] |
| 19647 | The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux] |
| 6010 | Illusions are not false perceptions, as we accurately perceive the pattern of atoms [Epicurus, by Modrak] |
| 19652 | How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux] |
| 19668 | Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux] |
| 14041 | The soul is fine parts distributed through the body, resembling hot breath [Epicurus] |
| 19650 | The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux] |
| 14042 | The soul cannot be incorporeal, because then it could neither act nor be acted upon [Epicurus] |
| 14032 | Totality has no edge; an edge implies a contrast beyond the edge, and there can't be one [Epicurus] |
| 14033 | Bodies are unlimited as well as void, since the two necessarily go together [Epicurus] |
| 14034 | There exists an infinity of each shape of atom, but the number of shapes is beyond our knowledge [Epicurus] |
| 14035 | Atoms just have shape, size and weight; colour results from their arrangement [Epicurus] |
| 14038 | There cannot be unlimited division, because it would reduce things to non-existence [Epicurus] |
| 14049 | We aim to know the natures which are observed in natural phenomena [Epicurus] |
| 19667 | If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux] |
| 19670 | Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux] |
| 14043 | The void cannot interact, but just gives the possibility of motion [Epicurus] |
| 14031 | Space must exist, since movement is obvious, and there must be somewhere to move in [Epicurus] |
| 14036 | There are endless cosmoi, some like and some unlike this one [Epicurus] |
| 19653 | The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux] |
| 19658 | Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux] |