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All the ideas for 'After Finitude', 'Dawn (Daybreak)' and 'Contemporary theories of Knowledge (2nd)'

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95 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 2. Wise People
Don't use wisdom in order to become clever! [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux]
The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 6. Twentieth Century Thought
In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / d. Nineteenth century philosophy
Early 19th century German philosophers enjoyed concepts, rather than scientific explanations [Nietzsche]
Carlyle spent his life vainly trying to make reason appear romantic [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
What we think is totally dictated by the language available to express it [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
The desire for a complete system requires making the weak parts look equal to the rest [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Why should truth be omnipotent? It is enough that it is very powerful [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
Like animals, we seek truth because we want safety [Nietzsche]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 7. Paraconsistency
We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux]
Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux]
Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 1. Knowledge
The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist [Pollock/Cruz]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 3. Value of Knowledge
Most people treat knowledge as a private possession [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively [Pollock/Cruz]
To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing [Pollock/Cruz]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification [Pollock/Cruz]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
We may be unable to remember, but we may never actually forget [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz]
Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / d. Rational foundations
Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz]
Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start [Pollock/Cruz]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
There is no one scientific method; we must try many approaches, and many emotions [Nietzsche]
How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion [Pollock/Cruz]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies? [Pollock/Cruz]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation [Pollock/Cruz]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
We can cultivate our drives, of anger, pity, curiosity, vanity, like a gardener, with good or bad taste [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Things are the boundaries of humanity, so all things must be known, for self-knowledge [Nietzsche]
Our knowledge of the many drives that constitute us is hopelessly incomplete [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
People used to think that outcomes were from God, rather than consequences of acts [Nietzsche]
19. Language / F. Communication / 1. Rhetoric
It is essential that wise people learn to express their wisdom, possibly even as foolishness [Nietzsche]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Actions done for a purpose are least understood, because we complacently think it's obvious [Nietzsche]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
Beauty in art is the imitation of happiness [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
The very idea of a critique of morality is regarded as immoral! [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / h. Against ethics
Morality prevents us from developing better customs [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Moral feelings are entirely different from the moral concepts used to judge actions [Nietzsche]
Treating morality as feelings is just obeying your ancestors [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
Human beings are not majestic, either through divine origins, or through grand aims [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Most dying people have probably lost more important things than what they are about to lose [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / g. Love
Marriage is too serious to be permitted for people in love! [Nietzsche]
Marriage upholds the idea that love, though a passion, can endure [Nietzsche]
Fear reveals the natures of other people much more clearly than love does [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Punishment has distorted the pure innocence of the contingency of outcomes [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / A. Egoism / 1. Ethical Egoism
People do nothing for their real ego, but only for a phantom ego created by other people [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 2. Golden Rule
If you feel to others as they feel to themselves, you must hate a self-hater [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
Honesty is a new young virtue, and we can promote it, or not [Nietzsche]
The Jews treated great anger as holy, and were in awe of those who expressed it [Nietzsche]
Christianity replaces rational philosophical virtues with great passions focused on God [Nietzsche]
The cardinal virtues want us to be honest, brave, magnanimous and polite [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / d. Courage
Cool courage and feverish bravery have one name, but are two very different virtues [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Teach youth to respect people who differ with them, not people who agree with them [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
Seeing duty as a burden makes it a bit cruel, and it can thus never become a habit [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 6. Authentic Self
Most people think they are already complete, but we can cultivate ourselves [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
No authority ever willingly accepts criticism [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
People govern for the pleasure of it, or just to avoid being governed [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 4. Changing the State / c. Revolution
The French Revolution gave trusting Europe the false delusion of instant recovery [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Get rid of the idea of punishment! It is a noxious weed! [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 1. War / a. Just wars
Modern wars arise from the study of history [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / d. Study of history
History does not concern what really happened, but supposed events, which have all the influence [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux]
Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Enquirers think finding our origin is salvation, but it turns out to be dull [Nietzsche]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Christianity hoped for a short cut to perfection, that skipped the hard labour of morality [Nietzsche]
Christianity was successful because of its heathen rituals [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
'I believe because it is absurd' - but how about 'I believe because I am absurd' [Nietzsche]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / b. Soul
The easy and graceful aspects of a person are called 'soul', and inner awkwardness is called 'soulless' [Nietzsche]