Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'After Finitude', 'Philosophical Analysis' and 'World and Essence'

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37 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
19648 Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux]
19674 The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 6. Twentieth Century Thought
19657 In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 1. Nature of Analysis
13750 Analysis aims at the structure of facts, which are needed to give a rationale to analysis [Urmson, by Schaffer,J]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
19675 Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
19649 Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
19666 If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
19656 Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 7. Paraconsistency
19663 We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux]
19664 Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux]
19665 Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
19677 What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
19659 The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
19662 It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
19654 We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
16435 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
14655 The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14658 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14656 Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14654 Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
14653 X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
14660 If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
14661 Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
14657 Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14652 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
19660 Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
19671 The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
14659 We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
19651 Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
19647 The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
19652 How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
19668 Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
19650 The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
19667 If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux]
19670 Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
19653 The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
19658 Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux]