144 ideas
20383 | The wisest man is full of contradictions, and attuned to other people, with occasional harmony [Nietzsche] |
19648 | Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux] |
19674 | The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux] |
19657 | In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux] |
4520 | I don't want to persuade anyone to be a philosopher; they should be rare plants [Nietzsche] |
4588 | There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences [Heil] |
19675 | Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux] |
19649 | Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux] |
4545 | Could not the objective character of things be merely a difference of degree within the subjective? [Nietzsche] |
4530 | Reason is a mere idiosyncrasy of a certain species of animal [Nietzsche] |
4523 | What can be 'demonstrated' is of little worth [Nietzsche] |
19666 | If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux] |
4531 | Our inability to both affirm and deny a single thing is merely an inability, not a 'necessity' [Nietzsche] |
19656 | Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux] |
4541 | Everything simple is merely imaginary [Nietzsche] |
20357 | Truth was given value by morality, but eventually turned against its own source [Nietzsche] |
4534 | 'Truth' is the will to be master over the multiplicity of sensations [Nietzsche] |
4548 | Only because there is thought is there untruth [Nietzsche] |
5652 | True beliefs are those which augment one's power [Nietzsche, by Scruton] |
4508 | The truth is what gives us the minimum of spiritual effort, and avoids the exhaustion of lying [Nietzsche] |
4538 | Judgements can't be true and known in isolation; the only surety is in connections and relations [Nietzsche] |
19663 | We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux] |
19664 | Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux] |
19665 | Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux] |
20361 | We need 'unities' for reckoning, but that does not mean they exist [Nietzsche] |
19677 | What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux] |
4533 | Logic and maths refer to fictitious entities which we have created [Nietzsche] |
19659 | The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux] |
20359 | The nature of being, of things, is much easier to understand than is becoming [Nietzsche] |
19662 | It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux] |
19654 | We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux] |
4616 | A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws [Heil] |
4525 | There are no facts in themselves, only interpretations [Nietzsche] |
4543 | There are no 'facts-in-themselves', since a sense must be projected into them to make them 'facts' [Nietzsche] |
4484 | Nihilism results from valuing the world by the 'categories of reason', because that is fiction [Nietzsche] |
4603 | Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws [Heil] |
4617 | A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone [Heil] |
4615 | Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties [Heil] |
4612 | Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate [Heil] |
4587 | From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property [Heil] |
4546 | We realise that properties are sensations of the feeling subject, not part of the thing [Nietzsche] |
4611 | The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties [Heil] |
4544 | A thing has no properties if it has no effect on other 'things' [Nietzsche] |
20362 | We saw unity in things because our ego seemed unified (but now we doubt the ego!) [Nietzsche] |
4592 | If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat [Heil] |
4528 | For me, a priori 'truths' are just provisional assumptions [Nietzsche] |
19660 | Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux] |
19671 | The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux] |
4586 | You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology [Heil] |
4537 | We can't know whether there is knowledge if we don't know what it is [Nietzsche] |
4485 | Every belief is a considering-something-true [Nietzsche] |
4487 | A note for asses: What convinces is not necessarily true - it is merely convincing [Nietzsche] |
4591 | Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality [Heil] |
19651 | Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux] |
4539 | The forms of 'knowledge' about logic which precede experience are actually regulations of belief [Nietzsche] |
4529 | All sense perceptions are permeated with value judgements (useful or harmful) [Nietzsche] |
19647 | The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux] |
4532 | We can have two opposite sensations, like hard and soft, at the same time [Nietzsche] |
4486 | The extreme view is there are only perspectives, no true beliefs, because there is no true world [Nietzsche] |
19652 | How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux] |
19668 | Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux] |
4610 | Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought [Heil] |
4618 | If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind [Heil] |
4536 | It is a major blunder to think of consciousness as a unity, and hence as an entity, a thing [Nietzsche] |
4621 | Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities [Heil] |
4623 | Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery [Heil] |
4626 | The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world [Heil] |
19650 | The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux] |
4551 | Great self-examination is to become conscious of oneself not as an individual, but as mankind [Nietzsche] |
4622 | Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements [Heil] |
4527 | Perhaps we are not single subjects, but a multiplicity of 'cells', interacting to create thought [Nietzsche] |
4590 | If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem [Heil] |
20374 | Consciousness is a terminal phenomenon, and causes nothing [Nietzsche] |
4614 | Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil] |
4595 | No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene [Heil] |
4599 | Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property [Heil] |
4624 | If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia [Heil] |
4601 | Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels [Heil] |
4602 | Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels [Heil] |
4593 | 'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil] |
4597 | Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil] |
4609 | It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs [Heil] |
4596 | The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem [Heil] |
4598 | Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them [Heil] |
4619 | 'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised [Heil] |
4620 | Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things [Heil] |
4594 | A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil] |
4625 | Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional? [Heil] |
23938 | Passions are ranked, as if they are non-rational and animal pleasure seeking [Nietzsche] |
23939 | We fail to see that reason is a network of passions, and every passion contains some reason [Nietzsche] |
4607 | Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are [Heil] |
4605 | Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning' [Heil] |
4606 | To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble' [Heil] |
4604 | If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them? [Heil] |
4554 | The concept of the 'will' is just a false simplification by our understanding [Nietzsche] |
4552 | There is no such things a pure 'willing' on its own; the aim must always be part of it [Nietzsche] |
4521 | None of the ancients had the courage to deny morality by denying free will [Nietzsche] |
4496 | 'Conscience' is invented to value actions by intention and conformity to 'law', rather than consequences [Nietzsche] |
20136 | There is an extended logic to a great man's life, achieved by a sustained will [Nietzsche] |
20358 | The highest man can endure and control the greatest combination of powerful drives [Nietzsche] |
20369 | The highest man directs the values of the highest natures over millenia [Nietzsche] |
4506 | There is a conspiracy (a will to power) to make morality dominate other values, like knowledge and art [Nietzsche] |
4514 | The basic tendency of the weak has always been to pull down the strong, using morality [Nietzsche] |
20370 | All evaluation is from some perspective, and aims at survival [Nietzsche] |
20354 | The ruling drives of our culture all want to be the highest court of our values [Nietzsche] |
4505 | How can it be that I should prefer my neighbour to myself, but he should prefer me to himself? [Nietzsche] |
4509 | Utilitarians prefer consequences because intentions are unknowable - but so are consequences! [Nietzsche] |
4500 | It is a sign of degeneration when eudaimonistic values begin to prevail [Nietzsche] |
4558 | We have no more right to 'happiness' than worms [Nietzsche] |
4550 | Pleasure and pain are mere epiphenomena, and achievement requires that one desire both [Nietzsche] |
4517 | Egoism is inescapable, and when it grows weak, the power of love also grows weak [Nietzsche] |
4518 | The question about egoism is: what kind of ego? since not all egos are equal [Nietzsche] |
4519 | The ego is only a fiction, and doesn't exist at all [Nietzsche] |
4560 | The Golden Rule prohibits harmful actions, with the premise that actions will be requited [Nietzsche] |
4555 | The great error is to think that happiness derives from virtue, which in turn derives from free will [Nietzsche] |
4494 | Not "return to nature", for there has never yet been a natural humanity [Nietzsche] |
4498 | 'Love your enemy' is unnatural, for the natural law says 'love your neighbour and hate your enemy' [Nietzsche] |
4493 | Be natural! But how, if one happens to be "unnatural"? [Nietzsche] |
4511 | We would avoid a person who always needed reasons for remaining decent [Nietzsche] |
4512 | Virtue is pursued from self-interest and prudence, and reduces people to non-entities [Nietzsche] |
20372 | The instinct of the herd, the majority, aims for the mean, in the middle [Nietzsche] |
4510 | A path to power: to introduce a new virtue under the name of an old one [Nietzsche] |
4515 | Modesty, industriousness, benevolence and temperance are the virtues of a good slave [Nietzsche] |
4516 | Many virtues are merely restraints on the most creative qualities of a human being [Nietzsche] |
4559 | When powerless one desires freedom; if power is too weak, one desires equal power ('justice') [Nietzsche] |
4557 | The supposed great lovers of honour (Alexander etc) were actually great despisers of honour [Nietzsche] |
4507 | The categorical imperative needs either God behind it, or a metaphysic of the unity of reason [Nietzsche] |
4501 | Utilitarianism criticises the origins of morality, but still believes in it as much as Christians [Nietzsche] |
4489 | If faith is lost, people seek other authorities, in order to avoid the risk of willing personal goals [Nietzsche] |
4513 | Virtuous people are inferior because they are not 'persons', but conform to a fixed pattern [Nietzsche] |
4504 | Morality used to be for preservation, but now we can only experiment, giving ourselves moral goals [Nietzsche] |
4495 | The high points of culture and civilization do not coincide [Nietzsche] |
4491 | In modern society virtue is 'equal rights', but only because everyone is zero, so it is a sum of zeroes [Nietzsche] |
4542 | Science has taken the meaning out of causation; cause and effect are two equal sides of an equation [Nietzsche] |
4553 | We derive the popular belief in cause and effect from our belief that our free will causes things [Nietzsche] |
19667 | If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux] |
19670 | Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux] |
4535 | A 'species' is a stable phase of evolution, implying the false notion that evolution has a goal [Nietzsche] |
4497 | The concept of 'God' represents a turning away from life, and a critique of life [Nietzsche] |
4488 | Those who have abandoned God cling that much more firmly to the faith in morality [Nietzsche] |
4502 | Morality cannot survive when the God who sanctions it is missing [Nietzsche] |
19653 | The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux] |
19658 | Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux] |
4499 | Primitive Christianity is abolition of the state; it is opposed to defence, justice, patriotism and class [Nietzsche] |