Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'After Finitude', 'Nature Without Essence' and 'Towards a Universal Characteristic'

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40 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
19648 Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux]
19674 The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 6. Twentieth Century Thought
19657 In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
19675 Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
19649 Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
19666 If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
19656 Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 7. Paraconsistency
19664 Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux]
19663 We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux]
19665 Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
19370 'Blind thought' is reasoning without recognition of the ingredients of the reasoning [Leibniz, by Arthur,R]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 5. Incompleteness
19391 We can assign a characteristic number to every single object [Leibniz]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
17867 If a concept is not compact, it will not be presentable to finite minds [Almog]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / d. Natural numbers
17877 The number series is primitive, not the result of some set theoretic axioms [Almog]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
19390 Everything is subsumed under number, which is a metaphysical statics of the universe, revealing powers [Leibniz]
19677 What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
19659 The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
19662 It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
19654 We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
17872 Definitionalists rely on snapshot-concepts, instead of on the real processes [Almog]
17871 Fregean meanings are analogous to conceptual essence, defining a kind [Almog]
17866 Essential definition aims at existence conditions and structural truths [Almog]
17868 Surface accounts aren't exhaustive as they always allow unintended twin cases [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 10. Essence as Species
17870 Alien 'tigers' can't be tigers if they are not related to our tigers [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
17869 Kripke and Putnam offer an intermediary between real and nominal essences [Almog]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
17876 Individual essences are just cobbled together classificatory predicates [Almog]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
19660 Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
19671 The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
19651 Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
19647 The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
19652 How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
19668 Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
19650 The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
17873 Water must be related to water, just as tigers must be related to tigers [Almog]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
19667 If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux]
19670 Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
17864 Defining an essence comes no where near giving a thing's nature [Almog]
17863 Essences promise to reveal reality, but actually drive us away from it [Almog]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
19653 The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
19658 Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux]