Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'After Finitude', 'Eliminative Materialism and Prop. Attitudes' and 'The Metaontology of Abstraction'

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37 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux]
The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 6. Twentieth Century Thought
In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 1. Fallacy
It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 7. Paraconsistency
Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux]
We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux]
Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / d. Singular terms
Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / c. Neo-logicism
Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
Folk psychology may not be reducible, but that doesn't make it false [Kirk,R on Churchland,PM]
Eliminative materialism says folk psychology will be replaced, not reduced [Churchland,PM]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright]
Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux]
Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux]