56 ideas
| 19648 | Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux] |
| 19674 | The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux] |
| 19657 | In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux] |
| 6891 | Quine's naturalistic and empirical view is based entirely on first-order logic and set theory [Quine, by Mautner] |
| 6310 | Enquiry needs a conceptual scheme, so we should retain the best available [Quine] |
| 19675 | Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux] |
| 19649 | Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux] |
| 19666 | If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux] |
| 19656 | Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux] |
| 19663 | We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux] |
| 19664 | Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux] |
| 19665 | Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux] |
| 12798 | Plurals can in principle be paraphrased away altogether [Quine] |
| 17905 | Any progression will do nicely for numbers; they can all then be used to measure multiplicity [Quine] |
| 19677 | What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux] |
| 9556 | Nearly all of mathematics has to quantify over abstract objects [Quine] |
| 19659 | The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux] |
| 19662 | It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux] |
| 19654 | We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux] |
| 16462 | The quest for ultimate categories is the quest for a simple clear pattern of notation [Quine] |
| 15723 | Either dispositions rest on structures, or we keep saying 'all things being equal' [Quine] |
| 15490 | Explain unmanifested dispositions as structural similarities to objects which have manifested them [Quine, by Martin,CB] |
| 8504 | Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes [Quine, by Devitt] |
| 8464 | Physical objects in space-time are just events or processes, no matter how disconnected [Quine] |
| 7924 | The notion of a physical object is by far the most useful one for science [Quine] |
| 8482 | Mathematicians must be rational but not two-legged, cyclists the opposite. So a mathematical cyclist? [Quine] |
| 12136 | Cyclist are not actually essentially two-legged [Brody on Quine] |
| 17594 | We can paraphrase 'x=y' as a sequence of the form 'if Fx then Fy' [Quine] |
| 19660 | Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux] |
| 19671 | The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux] |
| 15725 | Normal conditionals have a truth-value gap when the antecedent is false. [Quine] |
| 15722 | Conditionals are pointless if the truth value of the antecedent is known [Quine] |
| 15719 | We feign belief in counterfactual antecedents, and assess how convincing the consequent is [Quine] |
| 15721 | Counterfactuals are plausible when dispositions are involved, as they imply structures [Quine] |
| 15720 | What stays the same in assessing a counterfactual antecedent depends on context [Quine] |
| 15724 | Counterfactuals have no place in a strict account of science [Quine] |
| 19651 | Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux] |
| 21912 | Fichte, Schelling and Hegel rejected transcendental idealism [Lewis,PB] |
| 21911 | Fichte, Hegel and Schelling developed versions of Absolute Idealism [Lewis,PB] |
| 19647 | The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux] |
| 4630 | Two theories can be internally consistent and match all the facts, yet be inconsistent with one another [Quine, by Baggini /Fosl] |
| 19652 | How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux] |
| 19668 | Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux] |
| 19650 | The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux] |
| 3131 | Quine expresses the instrumental version of eliminativism [Quine, by Rey] |
| 3988 | Indeterminacy of translation also implies indeterminacy in interpreting people's mental states [Dennett on Quine] |
| 6311 | The firmer the links between sentences and stimuli, the less translations can diverge [Quine] |
| 6312 | We can never precisely pin down how to translate the native word 'Gavagai' [Quine] |
| 6313 | Stimulus synonymy of 'Gavagai' and 'Rabbit' does not even guarantee they are coextensive [Quine] |
| 6317 | Dispositions to speech behaviour, and actual speech, are never enough to fix any one translation [Quine] |
| 6315 | We should be suspicious of a translation which implies that a people have very strange beliefs [Quine] |
| 6314 | Weird translations are always possible, but they improve if we impose our own logic on them [Quine] |
| 19667 | If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux] |
| 19670 | Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux] |
| 19653 | The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux] |
| 19658 | Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux] |