Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'After Finitude', 'Could a computer ever understand?' and 'The Metaphysics of Modality'

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51 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
19648 Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux]
19674 The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 6. Twentieth Century Thought
19657 In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
12027 There must be a plausible epistemological theory alongside any metaphysical theory [Forbes,G]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
19675 Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
19649 Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
19666 If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
19656 Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / a. Symbols of PL
12005 The symbol 'ι' forms definite descriptions; (ιx)F(x) says 'the x which is such that F(x)' [Forbes,G]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 7. Paraconsistency
19663 We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux]
19664 Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux]
19665 Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / d. and
12010 Is the meaning of 'and' given by its truth table, or by its introduction and elimination rules? [Forbes,G]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
19677 What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
19659 The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
19662 It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
19654 We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / d. Vagueness as linguistic
12023 Vagueness problems arise from applying sharp semantics to vague languages [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
12017 In all instances of identity, there must be some facts to ensure the identity [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
12024 If we combined two clocks, it seems that two clocks may have become one clock. [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11885 Only individual essences will ground identities across worlds in other properties [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
12014 An individual essence is a set of essential properties which only that object can have [Forbes,G]
12015 Non-trivial individual essence is properties other than de dicto, or universal, or relational [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
12013 Essential properties depend on a category, and perhaps also on particular facts [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
12012 Essential properties are those without which an object could not exist [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 11. Essence of Artefacts
12022 Same parts does not ensure same artefact, if those parts could constitute a different artefact [Forbes,G]
12025 Artefacts have fuzzy essences [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
12020 An individual might change their sex in a world, but couldn't have differed in sex at origin [Forbes,G]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
11888 Identities must hold because of other facts, which must be instrinsic [Forbes,G, by Mackie,P]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
12003 De re modal formulae, unlike de dicto, are sensitive to transworld identities [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
19660 Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
19671 The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 4. Necessity from Concepts
12028 De re necessity is a form of conceptual necessity, just as de dicto necessity is [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
12008 Unlike places and times, we cannot separate possible worlds from what is true at them [Forbes,G]
12009 The problem with possible worlds realism is epistemological; we can't know properties of possible objects [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
12007 Possible worlds are points of logical space, rather like other times than our own [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
12011 Transworld identity concerns the limits of possibility for ordinary things [Forbes,G]
12016 The problem of transworld identity can be solved by individual essences [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
12004 Counterpart theory is not good at handling the logic of identity [Forbes,G]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
12021 Haecceitism attributes to each individual a primitive identity or thisness [Forbes,G]
12029 We believe in thisnesses, because we reject bizarre possibilities as not being about that individual [Forbes,G]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
19651 Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
19647 The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
19652 How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
19668 Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
4921 Quantum states in microtubules could bind brain activity to produce consciousness [Penrose]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
19650 The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
19667 If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux]
19670 Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
19653 The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
19658 Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux]