Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'After Finitude', 'Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy' and 'The Laws'

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100 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux]
The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux]
1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 6. Twentieth Century Thought
In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
We shouldn't always follow where the argument leads! [Lewis on Plato]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
Linguistic philosophy approaches problems by attending to actual linguistic usage [Mautner]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analytic philosophy studies the unimportant, and sharpens tools instead of using them [Mautner]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
The 'hermeneutic circle' says parts and wholes are interdependent, and so cannot be interpreted [Mautner]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
It is foolish to quarrel with the mind's own reasoning processes [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
We ought to follow where the argument leads us [Plato]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 9. Limits of Reason
Mortals are incapable of being fully rational [Plato]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
'Real' definitions give the essential properties of things under a concept [Mautner]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 7. Contextual Definition
'Contextual definitions' replace whole statements, not just expressions [Mautner]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 9. Recursive Definition
Recursive definition defines each instance from a previous instance [Mautner]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 10. Stipulative Definition
A stipulative definition lays down that an expression is to have a certain meaning [Mautner]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
Ostensive definitions point to an object which an expression denotes [Mautner]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 5. Fallacy of Composition
The fallacy of composition is the assumption that what is true of the parts is true of the whole [Mautner]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
Truth has the supreme value, for both gods and men [Plato]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 4. Fuzzy Logic
Fuzzy logic is based on the notion that there can be membership of a set to some degree [Mautner]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 7. Paraconsistency
We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux]
Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux]
Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 6. Entailment
Entailment is logical requirement; it may be not(p and not-q), but that has problems [Mautner]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 7. Strict Implication
Strict implication says false propositions imply everything, and everything implies true propositions [Mautner]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
'Material implication' is defined as 'not(p and not-q)', but seems to imply a connection between p and q [Mautner]
A person who 'infers' draws the conclusion, but a person who 'implies' leaves it to the audience [Mautner]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
Vagueness seems to be inconsistent with the view that every proposition is true or false [Mautner]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Quantifiers turn an open sentence into one to which a truth-value can be assigned [Mautner]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
To grasp a thing we need its name, its definition, and what it really is [Plato]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 5. Contingency
Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 7. Chance
The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 9. Counterfactuals
Counterfactuals are not true, they are merely valid [Mautner]
Counterfactuals are true if in every world close to actual where p is the case, q is also the case [Mautner]
Counterfactuals say 'If it had been, or were, p, then it would be q' [Mautner]
Maybe counterfactuals are only true if they contain valid inference from premisses [Mautner]
Counterfactuals presuppose a belief (or a fact) that the condition is false [Mautner]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
Essentialism is often identified with belief in 'de re' necessary truths [Mautner]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
Fallibilism is the view that all knowledge-claims are provisional [Mautner]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
'Sense-data' arrived in 1910, but it denotes ideas in Locke, Berkeley and Hume [Mautner]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux]
14. Science / C. Induction / 3. Limits of Induction
Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
Observing lots of green x can confirm 'all x are green' or 'all x are grue', where 'grue' is arbitrary [Mautner, by PG]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
'All x are y' is equivalent to 'all non-y are non-x', so observing paper is white confirms 'ravens are black' [Mautner, by PG]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
Soul is what is defined by 'self-generating motion' [Plato]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
My individuality is my soul, which carries my body around [Plato]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
The references of indexicals ('there', 'now', 'I') depend on the circumstances of utterance [Mautner]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
Double effect is the distinction between what is foreseen and what is intended [Mautner]
Double effect acts need goodness, unintended evil, good not caused by evil, and outweighing [Mautner]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 4. Beauty
People who value beauty above virtue insult the soul by placing the body above it [Plato]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
'Essentialism' is opposed to existentialism, and claims there is a human nature [Mautner]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
An action is only just if it is performed by someone with a just character and outlook [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
Attempted murder is like real murder, but we should respect the luck which avoided total ruin [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / c. Value of pleasure
It would be strange if the gods rewarded those who experienced the most pleasure in life [Plato]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / f. Dangers of pleasure
The conquest of pleasure is the noblest victory of all [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
Virtue is a concord of reason and emotion, with pleasure and pain trained to correct ends [Plato]
A serious desire for moral excellence is very rare indeed [Plato]
Every crime is the result of excessive self-love [Plato]
The only worthwhile life is one devoted to physical and moral perfection [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / d. Teaching virtue
Virtue is the aim of all laws [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
The Guardians must aim to discover the common element in the four cardinal virtues [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / b. Temperance
Excessive laughter and tears must be avoided [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
Injustice is the mastery of the soul by bad feelings, even if they do not lead to harm [Plato]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
The best people are produced where there is no excess of wealth or poverty [Plato]
Virtue and great wealth are incompatible [Plato]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
Totalitarian states destroy friendships and community spirit [Plato]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 7. Communitarianism / a. Communitarianism
Education in virtue produces citizens who are active but obedient [Plato]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Friendship is impossible between master and slave, even if they are made equal [Plato]
Men and women should qualify equally for honours on merit [Plato]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Sound laws achieve the happiness of those who observe them [Plato]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Justice is granting the equality which unequals deserve [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / b. Education principles
Children's games should channel their pleasures into adult activity [Plato]
Control of education is the key office of state, and should go to the best citizen [Plato]
Mathematics has the widest application of any subject on the curriculum [Plato]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / c. Teaching
Education is channelling a child's feelings into the right course before it understands why [Plato]
The best way to educate the young is not to rebuke them, but to set a good example [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / a. Final purpose
Creation is not for you; you exist for the sake of creation [Plato]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux]
Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 3. The Beginning
Movement is transmitted through everything, and it must have started with self-generated motion [Plato]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
In 'The Laws', to obey the law is to be obey god [Plato, by MacIntyre]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
The only possible beginning for the endless motions of reality is something self-generated [Plato]
Self-moving soul has to be the oldest thing there is [Plato]
Self-generating motion is clearly superior to all other kinds of motion [Plato]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
Soul must be the cause of all the opposites, such as good and evil or beauty and ugliness [Plato]
If all the motions of nature reflect calculations of reason, then the best kind of soul must direct it [Plato]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux]
If astronomical movements are seen as necessary instead of by divine will, this leads to atheism [Plato]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 1. Animism
The heavens must be full of gods, controlling nature either externally or from within [Plato]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 4. Dualist Religion
There must be at least two souls controlling the cosmos, one doing good, the other the opposite [Plato]