100 ideas
| 19648 | Since Kant we think we can only access 'correlations' between thinking and being [Meillassoux] |
| 19674 | The Copernican Revolution decentres the Earth, but also decentres thinking from reality [Meillassoux] |
| 19657 | In Kant the thing-in-itself is unknowable, but for us it has become unthinkable [Meillassoux] |
| 20121 | Grammar only reveals popular metaphysics [Nietzsche] |
| 19675 | Since Kant, philosophers have claimed to understand science better than scientists do [Meillassoux] |
| 19649 | Since Kant, objectivity is defined not by the object, but by the statement's potential universality [Meillassoux] |
| 19666 | If we insist on Sufficient Reason the world will always be a mystery to us [Meillassoux] |
| 19656 | Non-contradiction is unjustified, so it only reveals a fact about thinking, not about reality? [Meillassoux] |
| 24082 | Is the will to truth the desire to avoid deception? [Nietzsche] |
| 19663 | We can allow contradictions in thought, but not inconsistency [Meillassoux] |
| 19664 | Paraconsistent logics are to prevent computers crashing when data conflicts [Meillassoux] |
| 19665 | Paraconsistent logic is about statements, not about contradictions in reality [Meillassoux] |
| 4098 | The theory of descriptions supports internalism, since they are thinkable when the object is non-existent [Crane] |
| 19677 | What is mathematically conceivable is absolutely possible [Meillassoux] |
| 19659 | The absolute is the impossibility of there being a necessary existent [Meillassoux] |
| 20360 | We Germans value becoming and development more highly than mere being of what 'is' [Nietzsche] |
| 19662 | It is necessarily contingent that there is one thing rather than another - so something must exist [Meillassoux] |
| 19654 | We must give up the modern criterion of existence, which is a correlation between thought and being [Meillassoux] |
| 4077 | Aesthetic properties of thing supervene on their physical properties [Crane] |
| 4078 | Constitution (as in a statue constituted by its marble) is supervenience without identity [Crane] |
| 4082 | The distinction between 'resultant' properties (weight) and 'emergent' properties is a bit vague [Crane] |
| 4083 | If mental properties are emergent they add a new type of causation, and physics is not complete [Crane] |
| 4079 | Properties are causes [Crane] |
| 4068 | Traditional substance is separate from properties and capable of independent existence [Crane] |
| 24077 | Necessity is thought to require an event, but is only an after-effect of the event [Nietzsche] |
| 19660 | Possible non-being which must be realised is 'precariousness'; absolute contingency might never not-be [Meillassoux] |
| 19671 | The idea of chance relies on unalterable physical laws [Meillassoux] |
| 20126 | The strength of knowledge is not its truth, but its entrenchment in our culture [Nietzsche] |
| 4097 | Maybe there are two kinds of belief - 'de re' beliefs and 'de dicto' beliefs [Crane] |
| 4096 | Maybe beliefs don't need to be conscious, if you are not conscious of the beliefs guiding your actions [Crane] |
| 4093 | Many cases of knowing how can be expressed in propositional terms (like how to get somewhere) [Crane] |
| 19651 | Unlike speculative idealism, transcendental idealism assumes the mind is embodied [Meillassoux] |
| 20119 | We became increasingly conscious of our sense impressions in order to communicate them [Nietzsche] |
| 19647 | The aspects of objects that can be mathematical allow it to have objective properties [Meillassoux] |
| 4108 | Phenol-thio-urea tastes bitter to three-quarters of people, but to the rest it is tasteless, so which is it? [Crane] |
| 4105 | The traditional supports for the sense datum theory were seeing double and specks before one's eyes [Crane] |
| 4104 | One can taste that the wine is sour, and one can also taste the sourness of the wine [Crane] |
| 4101 | If we smell something we are aware of the smell separately, but we don't perceive a 'look' when we see [Crane] |
| 4102 | The problems of perception disappear if it is a relation to an intentional state, not to an object or sense datum [Crane] |
| 4109 | If perception is much richer than our powers of description, this suggests that it is non-conceptual [Crane] |
| 4103 | The adverbial theory of perceptions says it is the experiences which have properties, not the objects [Crane] |
| 20122 | We have no organ for knowledge or truth; we only 'know' what is useful to the human herd [Nietzsche] |
| 4065 | Is knowledge just a state of mind, or does it also involve the existence of external things? [Crane] |
| 4423 | We assume causes, geometry, motion, bodies etc to live, but they haven't been proved [Nietzsche] |
| 6579 | Nietzsche's perspectivism says our worldview depends on our personality [Nietzsche, by Fogelin] |
| 24083 | It would be absurd to say we are only permitted our own single perspective [Nietzsche] |
| 19652 | How can we mathematically describe a world that lacks humans? [Meillassoux] |
| 19668 | Hume's question is whether experimental science will still be valid tomorrow [Meillassoux] |
| 20115 | All of our normal mental life could be conducted without consciousness [Nietzsche] |
| 20117 | Only the need for communication has led to consciousness developing [Nietzsche] |
| 20118 | Only our conscious thought is verbal, and this shows the origin of consciousness [Nietzsche] |
| 4092 | The core of the consciousness problem is the case of Mary, zombies, and the Hard Question [Crane] |
| 20116 | Most of our lives, even the important parts, take place outside of consciousness [Nietzsche] |
| 20120 | Whatever moves into consciousness becomes thereby much more superficial [Nietzsche] |
| 4087 | Intentionalism does not require that all mental states be propositional attitudes [Crane] |
| 4095 | Object-directed attitudes like love are just as significant as propositional attitudes [Crane] |
| 4106 | If someone removes their glasses the content of experience remains, but the quality changes [Crane] |
| 4089 | Pains have a region of the body as their intentional content, not some pain object [Crane] |
| 4090 | Weak intentionalism says qualia are extra properties; strong intentionalism says they are intentional [Crane] |
| 4107 | With inverted qualia a person's experiences would change, but their beliefs remain the same [Crane] |
| 19650 | The transcendental subject is not an entity, but a set of conditions making science possible [Meillassoux] |
| 2932 | 'Know thyself' is impossible and ridiculous [Nietzsche] |
| 4069 | Descartes did not think of minds as made of a substance, because they are not divisible [Crane] |
| 4074 | Functionalism defines mental states by their causal properties, which rules out epiphenomenalism [Crane] |
| 4091 | The problems of misrepresentation and error have dogged physicalist reductions of intentionality [Crane] |
| 4070 | Properties dualism says mental properties are distinct from physical, despite a single underlying substance [Crane] |
| 4084 | Non-reductive physicalism seeks an explanation of supervenience, but emergentists accept it as basic [Crane] |
| 4080 | If mental supervenes on the physical, then every physical cause will be accompanied by a mental one [Crane] |
| 4075 | Identity theory is either of particular events, or of properties, depending on your theory of causation [Crane] |
| 4085 | Physicalism may be the source of the mind-body problem, rather than its solution [Crane] |
| 4073 | Overdetermination occurs if two events cause an effect, when each would have caused it alone [Crane] |
| 4072 | The completeness of physics must be an essential component of any physicalist view of mind [Crane] |
| 4094 | Experience teaches us propositions, because we can reason about our phenomenal experience [Crane] |
| 24078 | Thoughts cannot be fully reproduced in words [Nietzsche] |
| 24081 | Most of our intellectual activity is unconscious [Nietzsche] |
| 4100 | The Twin Earth argument depends on reference being determined by content, which may be false. [Crane] |
| 4067 | Broad content entails the existence of the object of the thought [Crane] |
| 4063 | In intensional contexts, truth depends on how extensions are conceived. [Crane] |
| 2933 | Why do you listen to the voice of your conscience? [Nietzsche] |
| 20141 | Higher human beings see and hear far more than others, and do it more thoughtfully [Nietzsche] |
| 24076 | A morality ranks human drives and actions, for the sake of the herd, and subordinating individuals [Nietzsche] |
| 22471 | Nietzsche thought it 'childish' to say morality isn't binding because it varies between cultures [Nietzsche, by Foot] |
| 2935 | No two actions are the same [Nietzsche] |
| 20198 | Many virtues are harmful traps, but that is why other people praise them [Nietzsche] |
| 4275 | You cannot advocate joyful wisdom while rejecting pity, because the two are complementary [Scruton on Nietzsche] |
| 2934 | To see one's own judgement as a universal law is selfish [Nietzsche] |
| 24080 | We should give style to our character - by applying an artistic plan to its strengths and weaknesses [Nietzsche] |
| 20125 | The ethical teacher exists to give purpose to what happens necessarily and without purpose [Nietzsche] |
| 9306 | To ward off boredom at any cost is vulgar [Nietzsche] |
| 24079 | The best life is the dangerous life [Nietzsche] |
| 2936 | Imagine if before each of your actions you had to accept repeating the action over and over again [Nietzsche] |
| 6842 | Nietzsche says facing up to the eternal return of meaninglessness is the response to nihilism [Nietzsche, by Critchley] |
| 4071 | Causation can be seen in counterfactual terms, or as increased probability, or as energy flow [Crane] |
| 4076 | Causes are properties, not events, because properties are what make a difference in a situation [Crane] |
| 19667 | If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux] |
| 19670 | Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux] |
| 4066 | It seems that 'exists' could sometimes be a predicate [Crane] |
| 19653 | The ontological proof of a necessary God ensures a reality external to the mind [Meillassoux] |
| 2931 | God is dead, and we have killed him [Nietzsche] |
| 19658 | Now that the absolute is unthinkable, even atheism is just another religious belief (though nihilist) [Meillassoux] |