Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro: Theories of Vagueness', 'A Mathematical Introduction to Logic (2nd)' and 'Letter to Herodotus'

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72 ideas

1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
If we are to use words in enquiry, we need their main, unambiguous and uncontested meanings [Epicurus]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
Observation and applied thought are always true [Epicurus]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 3. Truth Tables
Until the 1960s the only semantics was truth-tables [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S5 collapses iterated modalities (◊□P→□P, and ◊◊P→◊P) [Keefe/Smith]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / a. Symbols of ST
'dom R' indicates the 'domain' of objects having a relation [Enderton]
'fld R' indicates the 'field' of all objects in the relation [Enderton]
'ran R' indicates the 'range' of objects being related to [Enderton]
We write F:A→B to indicate that A maps into B (the output of F on A is in B) [Enderton]
'F(x)' is the unique value which F assumes for a value of x [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
A relation is 'symmetric' on a set if every ordered pair has the relation in both directions [Enderton]
A relation is 'transitive' if it can be carried over from two ordered pairs to a third [Enderton]
The 'powerset' of a set is all the subsets of a given set [Enderton]
Two sets are 'disjoint' iff their intersection is empty [Enderton]
A 'domain' of a relation is the set of members of ordered pairs in the relation [Enderton]
A 'relation' is a set of ordered pairs [Enderton]
A 'function' is a relation in which each object is related to just one other object [Enderton]
A function 'maps A into B' if the relating things are set A, and the things related to are all in B [Enderton]
A function 'maps A onto B' if the relating things are set A, and the things related to are set B [Enderton]
A relation is 'reflexive' on a set if every member bears the relation to itself [Enderton]
A relation satisfies 'trichotomy' if all pairs are either relations, or contain identical objects [Enderton]
A set is 'dominated' by another if a one-to-one function maps the first set into a subset of the second [Enderton]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / e. Equivalence classes
An 'equivalence relation' is a reflexive, symmetric and transitive binary relation [Enderton]
We 'partition' a set into distinct subsets, according to each relation on its objects [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Inference not from content, but from the fact that it was said, is 'conversational implicature' [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
Validity is either semantic (what preserves truth), or proof-theoretic (following procedures) [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
A logical truth or tautology is a logical consequence of the empty set [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
A truth assignment to the components of a wff 'satisfy' it if the wff is then True [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 3. Soundness
A proof theory is 'sound' if its valid inferences entail semantic validity [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 4. Completeness
A proof theory is 'complete' if semantically valid inferences entail proof-theoretic validity [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 6. Compactness
Proof in finite subsets is sufficient for proof in an infinite set [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 7. Decidability
Expressions are 'decidable' if inclusion in them (or not) can be proved [Enderton]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 8. Enumerability
For a reasonable language, the set of valid wff's can always be enumerated [Enderton]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Nothing comes to be from what doesn't exist [Epicurus]
If disappearing things went to nothingness, nothing could return, and it would all be gone by now [Epicurus]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
The totality is complete, so there is no room for it to change, and nothing extraneous to change it [Epicurus]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Astronomical movements are blessed, but they don't need the help of the gods [Epicurus]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith]
The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith]
The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith]
Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith]
Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith]
The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith]
Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith]
People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith]
If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith]
How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 8. Properties as Modes
The perceived accidental properties of bodies cannot be conceived of as independent natures [Epicurus]
Accidental properties give a body its nature, but are not themselves bodies or parts of bodies [Epicurus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
A 'body' is a conception of an aggregate, with properties defined by application conditions [Epicurus]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change [Keefe/Smith]
Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement [Keefe/Smith]
If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness [Keefe/Smith]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
Bodies have impermanent properties, and permanent ones which define its conceived nature [Epicurus]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
Sentences with 'if' are only conditionals if they can read as A-implies-B [Enderton]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / c. Possible but inconceivable
Above and below us will never appear to be the same, because it is inconceivable [Epicurus]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / c. Aim of beliefs
We aim to dissolve our fears, by understanding their causes [Epicurus]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
Atoms only have shape, weight and size, and the properties which accompany shape [Epicurus]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 3. Illusion Scepticism
Illusions are not false perceptions, as we accurately perceive the pattern of atoms [Epicurus, by Modrak]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 2. Psuche
The soul is fine parts distributed through the body, resembling hot breath [Epicurus]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
The soul cannot be incorporeal, because then it could neither act nor be acted upon [Epicurus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Totality has no edge; an edge implies a contrast beyond the edge, and there can't be one [Epicurus]
Bodies are unlimited as well as void, since the two necessarily go together [Epicurus]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / g. Atomism
There exists an infinity of each shape of atom, but the number of shapes is beyond our knowledge [Epicurus]
Atoms just have shape, size and weight; colour results from their arrangement [Epicurus]
There cannot be unlimited division, because it would reduce things to non-existence [Epicurus]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
We aim to know the natures which are observed in natural phenomena [Epicurus]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 1. Void
The void cannot interact, but just gives the possibility of motion [Epicurus]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 4. Substantival Space
Space must exist, since movement is obvious, and there must be somewhere to move in [Epicurus]
27. Natural Reality / E. Cosmology / 10. Multiverse
There are endless cosmoi, some like and some unlike this one [Epicurus]