Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Intro: Theories of Vagueness', 'Why Constitution is not Identity' and 'A History of God'

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29 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
S5 collapses iterated modalities (◊□P→□P, and ◊◊P→◊P) [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / b. Vagueness of reality
Objects such as a cloud or Mount Everest seem to have fuzzy boundaries in nature [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / c. Vagueness as ignorance
If someone is borderline tall, no further information is likely to resolve the question [Keefe/Smith]
The simplest approach, that vagueness is just ignorance, retains classical logic and semantics [Keefe/Smith]
The epistemic view of vagueness must explain why we don't know the predicate boundary [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / f. Supervaluation for vagueness
Supervaluationism keeps true-or-false where precision can be produced, but not otherwise [Keefe/Smith]
Vague statements lack truth value if attempts to make them precise fail [Keefe/Smith]
Some of the principles of classical logic still fail with supervaluationism [Keefe/Smith]
The semantics of supervaluation (e.g. disjunction and quantification) is not classical [Keefe/Smith]
Supervaluation misunderstands vagueness, treating it as a failure to make things precise [Keefe/Smith]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 10. Vagueness / g. Degrees of vagueness
A third truth-value at borderlines might be 'indeterminate', or a value somewhere between 0 and 1 [Keefe/Smith]
People can't be placed in a precise order according to how 'nice' they are [Keefe/Smith]
If truth-values for vagueness range from 0 to 1, there must be someone who is 'completely tall' [Keefe/Smith]
How do we decide if my coat is red to degree 0.322 or 0.321? [Keefe/Smith]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Clay is intrinsically and atomically the same as statue (and that lacks 'modal properties') [Rudder Baker]
The clay is not a statue - it borrows that property from the statue it constitutes [Rudder Baker]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
Is it possible for two things that are identical to become two separate things? [Rudder Baker]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / e. Vague objects
Vague predicates involve uncertain properties, uncertain objects, and paradoxes of gradual change [Keefe/Smith]
Many vague predicates are multi-dimensional; 'big' involves height and volume; heaps include arrangement [Keefe/Smith]
If there is a precise borderline area, that is not a case of vagueness [Keefe/Smith]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker]
Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker]
The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 4. Divine Contradictions
In the Bible God changes his mind (repenting of creating humanity, in the Flood) [Armstrong,K]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 1. Monotheism
Monotheism introduced intolerance into religious thinking [Armstrong,K]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 3. Hinduism
Around 800 BCE teachers superseded gods in India [Armstrong,K]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 2. Judaism
There is virtually no sign of monotheism in the Pentateuch [Armstrong,K]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
The idea that Jesus was God was only settled in the fourth century [Armstrong,K]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / e. Fideism
Faith is not just belief in propositions, but also putting trust in them [Armstrong,K]