8 ideas
5503 | Maybe personal identity is not vital in survival, and other continuations would suffice [Martin/Barresi] |
5504 | Maybe we should see persons in four dimensions, with stages or time-slices at an instant [Martin/Barresi] |
5502 | Locke's intrinsic view of personal identity has been replaced by an externalist view [Martin/Barresi] |
3178 | A fast machine could pass all behavioural tests with a vast lookup table [Block, by Rey] |
4056 | If the soul is held to leave the body at brain-death, it should arrive at the time of brain-creation [Lockwood] |
4055 | It isn't obviously wicked to destroy a potential human being (e.g. an ununited egg and sperm) [Lockwood] |
4054 | I may exist before I become a person, just as I exist before I become an adult [Lockwood] |
5505 | For Aristotle the psyche perishes with the body (except possibly 'nous') [Martin/Barresi] |