16 ideas
| 8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
| 9355 | One sort of circularity presupposes a premise, the other presupposes a rule being used [Braithwaite, by Devitt] |
| 23026 | We know mathematical axioms, such as subtracting equals from equals leaves equals, by a natural light [Leibniz] |
| 8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
| 13189 | A necessary feature (such as air for humans) is not therefore part of the essence [Leibniz] |
| 19432 | Intelligible truth is independent of any external things or experiences [Leibniz] |
| 8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
| 19430 | We know objects by perceptions, but their qualities don't reveal what it is we are perceiving [Leibniz] |
| 8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
| 19431 | There is nothing in the understanding but experiences, plus the understanding itself, and the understander [Leibniz] |
| 8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
| 8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
| 8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
| 8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
| 8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
| 8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |