Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Scientific Explanation', 'Troubles with Functionalism' and 'The Emergence of Probability'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

22 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 4. Later European Philosophy / b. Seventeenth century philosophy
7454 Gassendi is the first great empiricist philosopher [Hacking]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
9355 One sort of circularity presupposes a premise, the other presupposes a rule being used [Braithwaite, by Devitt]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
7447 Probability was fully explained between 1654 and 1812 [Hacking]
7448 Probability is statistical (behaviour of chance devices) or epistemological (belief based on evidence) [Hacking]
7449 Epistemological probability based either on logical implications or coherent judgments [Hacking]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
7450 In the medieval view, only deduction counted as true evidence [Hacking]
7451 Formerly evidence came from people; the new idea was that things provided evidence [Hacking]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
7452 An experiment is a test, or an adventure, or a diagnosis, or a dissection [Hacking, by PG]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
7459 Follow maths for necessary truths, and jurisprudence for contingent truths [Hacking]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / a. Nature of qualia
2584 Lobotomised patients can cease to care about a pain [Block]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
2582 A brain looks no more likely than anything else to cause qualia [Block]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2574 Behaviour requires knowledge as well as dispositions [Block]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
2576 In functionalism, desires are internal states with causal relations [Block]
2575 Functionalism is behaviourism, but with mental states as intermediaries [Block]
2583 You might invert colours, but you can't invert beliefs [Block]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
2578 Could a creature without a brain be in the right functional state for pain? [Block]
2585 Not just any old functional network will have mental states [Block]
2586 In functionalism, what are the special inputs and outputs of conscious creatures? [Block]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
2579 Physicalism is prejudiced in favour of our neurology, when other systems might have minds [Block]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / b. Turing Machines
2577 Simple machine-functionalism says mind just is a Turing machine [Block]
2580 A Turing machine, given a state and input, specifies an output and the next state [Block]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
2581 Intuition may say that a complex sentence is ungrammatical, but linguistics can show that it is not [Block]