18 ideas
19066 | Philosophy aims to understand the world, through ordinary experience and science [Dummett] |
19067 | A successful proof requires recognition of truth at every step [Dummett] |
9355 | One sort of circularity presupposes a premise, the other presupposes a rule being used [Braithwaite, by Devitt] |
19060 | Truth-tables are dubious in some cases, and may be a bad way to explain connective meaning [Dummett] |
11066 | Deduction is justified by the semantics of its metalanguage [Dummett, by Hanna] |
19058 | Syntactic consequence is positive, for validity; semantic version is negative, with counterexamples [Dummett] |
12766 | Logical space is abstracted from the actual world [Stalnaker] |
19063 | Beth trees show semantics for intuitionistic logic, in terms of how truth has been established [Dummett] |
19059 | In standard views you could replace 'true' and 'false' with mere 0 and 1 [Dummett] |
19062 | Classical two-valued semantics implies that meaning is grasped through truth-conditions [Dummett] |
19065 | Soundness and completeness proofs test the theory of meaning, rather than the logic theory [Dummett] |
12764 | For the bare particular view, properties must be features, not just groups of objects [Stalnaker] |
12761 | An essential property is one had in all the possible worlds where a thing exists [Stalnaker] |
12763 | Necessarily self-identical, or being what it is, or its world-indexed properties, aren't essential [Stalnaker] |
12762 | Bare particular anti-essentialism makes no sense within modal logic semantics [Stalnaker] |
12765 | Why imagine that Babe Ruth might be a billiard ball; nothing useful could be said about the ball [Stalnaker] |
19061 | An explanation is often a deduction, but that may well beg the question [Dummett] |
19064 | Holism is not a theory of meaning; it is the denial that a theory of meaning is possible [Dummett] |