64 ideas
| 6575 | Philosophy may never find foundations, and may undermine our lives in the process [Fogelin] |
| 2474 | It seems likely that analysis of concepts is impossible, but justification can survive without it [Fodor] |
| 2481 | Despite all the efforts of philosophers, nothing can ever be reduced to anything [Fodor] |
| 6585 | Rationality is threatened by fear of inconsistency, illusions of absolutes or relativism, and doubt [Fogelin] |
| 2505 | Turing invented the idea of mechanical rationality (just based on syntax) [Fodor] |
| 6557 | Humans may never be able to attain a world view which is both rich and consistent [Fogelin] |
| 6568 | A game can be played, despite having inconsistent rules [Fogelin] |
| 6560 | The law of noncontradiction is traditionally the most basic principle of rationality [Fogelin] |
| 6565 | The law of noncontradiction makes the distinction between asserting something and denying it [Fogelin] |
| 2470 | Transcendental arguments move from knowing Q to knowing P because it depends on Q [Fodor] |
| 6574 | Legal reasoning is analogical, not deductive [Fogelin] |
| 9355 | One sort of circularity presupposes a premise, the other presupposes a rule being used [Braithwaite, by Devitt] |
| 2469 | The world is full of messy small things producing stable large-scale properties (e.g. mountains) [Fodor] |
| 2475 | Don't define something by a good instance of it; a good example is a special case of the ordinary example [Fodor] |
| 6582 | Conventions can only work if they are based on something non-conventional [Fogelin] |
| 2502 | How do you count beliefs? [Fodor] |
| 2501 | Berkeley seems to have mistakenly thought that chairs are the same as after-images [Fodor] |
| 2465 | Maybe explaining the mechanics of perception will explain the concepts involved [Fodor] |
| 6576 | My view is 'circumspect rationalism' - that only our intellect can comprehend the world [Fogelin] |
| 2504 | Rationalism can be based on an evolved computational brain with innate structure [Fodor] |
| 2493 | According to empiricists abstraction is the fundamental mental process [Fodor] |
| 2494 | Rationalists say there is more to a concept than the experience that prompts it [Fodor] |
| 6589 | Knowledge is legitimate only if all relevant defeaters have been eliminated [Fogelin] |
| 6596 | For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent [Fogelin] |
| 6597 | A rule of justification might be: don't raise the level of scrutiny without a good reason [Fogelin] |
| 6588 | Scepticism is cartesian (sceptical scenarios), or Humean (future), or Pyrrhonian (suspend belief) [Fogelin] |
| 6590 | Scepticism deals in remote possibilities that are ineliminable and set the standard very high [Fogelin] |
| 6583 | Radical perspectivism replaces Kant's necessary scheme with many different schemes [Fogelin] |
| 2503 | Empirical approaches see mind connections as mirrors/maps of reality [Fodor] |
| 2508 | The function of a mind is obvious [Fodor] |
| 2485 | Do intentional states explain our behaviour? [Fodor] |
| 2506 | If I have a set of mental modules, someone had better be in charge of them! [Fodor] |
| 2467 | Functionalists see pains as properties involving relations and causation [Fodor] |
| 2489 | Why bother with neurons? You don't explain bird flight by examining feathers [Fodor] |
| 2468 | Type physicalism is a stronger claim than token physicalism [Fodor] |
| 2490 | Modern connectionism is just Hume's theory of the 'association' of 'ideas' [Fodor] |
| 2476 | The goal of thought is to understand the world, not instantly sort it into conceptual categories [Fodor] |
| 6555 | We are also irrational, with a unique ability to believe in bizarre self-created fictions [Fogelin] |
| 2496 | Blindness doesn't destroy spatial concepts [Fodor] |
| 2497 | Something must take an overview of the modules [Fodor] |
| 2509 | Modules have in-built specialist information [Fodor] |
| 2491 | Modules have encapsulation, inaccessibility, private concepts, innateness [Fodor] |
| 2495 | Obvious modules are language and commonsense explanation [Fodor] |
| 2499 | Modules analyse stimuli, they don't tell you what to do [Fodor] |
| 2498 | Modules make the world manageable [Fodor] |
| 2500 | Babies talk in consistent patterns [Fodor] |
| 2507 | Rationality rises above modules [Fodor] |
| 2483 | Mentalese doesn't require a theory of meaning [Fodor] |
| 2480 | Language is ambiguous, but thought isn't [Fodor] |
| 2487 | Mentalese may also incorporate some natural language [Fodor] |
| 2486 | Content can't be causal role, because causal role is decided by content [Fodor] |
| 2492 | Experience can't explain itself; the concepts needed must originate outside experience [Fodor] |
| 2471 | Are concepts best seen as capacities? [Fodor] |
| 2472 | For Pragmatists having a concept means being able to do something [Fodor] |
| 2482 | It seems unlikely that meaning can be reduced to communicative intentions, or any mental states [Fodor] |
| 2477 | If to understand "fish" you must know facts about them, where does that end? [Fodor] |
| 2473 | Analysis is impossible without the analytic/synthetic distinction [Fodor] |
| 2484 | The theory of the content of thought as 'Mentalese' explains why the Private Language Argument doesn't work [Fodor] |
| 6605 | Critics must be causally entangled with their subject matter [Fogelin] |
| 6607 | The word 'beautiful', when deprived of context, is nearly contentless [Fogelin] |
| 6604 | Saying 'It's all a matter to taste' ignores the properties of the object discussed [Fogelin] |
| 6586 | Cynics are committed to morality, but disappointed or disgusted by human failings [Fogelin] |
| 6572 | Deterrence, prevention, rehabilitation and retribution can come into conflict in punishments [Fogelin] |
| 6573 | Retributivists say a crime can be 'paid for'; deterrentists still worry about potential victims [Fogelin] |