9 ideas
| 9355 | One sort of circularity presupposes a premise, the other presupposes a rule being used [Braithwaite, by Devitt] |
| 18823 | To say there could have been people who don't exist, but deny those possible things, rejects Barcan [Stalnaker, by Rumfitt] |
| 16901 | The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge] |
| 16902 | Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge] |
| 16409 | Unlike Lewis, I defend an actualist version of counterpart theory [Stalnaker] |
| 16411 | If possible worlds really differ, I can't be in more than one at a time [Stalnaker] |
| 16412 | If counterparts exist strictly in one world only, this seems to be extreme invariant essentialism [Stalnaker] |
| 16892 | Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge] |
| 16410 | Extensional semantics has individuals and sets; modal semantics has intensions, functions of world to extension [Stalnaker] |