68 ideas
13567 | Ontology should give insight into or an explanation of the world revealed by science [Ellis] |
22611 | Metaphysics can criticise interpretations of science theories, and give good feedback [Ingthorsson] |
13604 | Real possibility and necessity has the logic of S5, which links equivalence classes of worlds of the same kind [Ellis] |
22609 | Philosophers accepted first-order logic, because they took science to be descriptive, not explanatory [Ingthorsson] |
13606 | Humean conceptions of reality drive the adoption of extensional logic [Ellis] |
22629 | Basic processes are said to be either physical, or organic, or psychological [Ingthorsson] |
22633 | Indirect realists are cautious about the manifest image, and prefer the scientific image [Ingthorsson] |
22606 | Neo-Humeans say there are no substantial connections between anything [Ingthorsson] |
13584 | The extension of a property is a contingent fact, so cannot be the essence of the property [Ellis] |
22631 | Properties are said to be categorical qualities or non-qualitative dispositions [Ingthorsson] |
13587 | There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way [Ellis] |
13577 | Typical 'categorical' properties are spatio-temporal, such as shape [Ellis] |
9436 | The property of 'being an electron' is not of anything, and only electrons could have it [Ellis] |
13582 | 'Being a methane molecule' is not a property - it is just a predicate [Ellis] |
13580 | Causal powers must necessarily act the way they do [Ellis] |
13598 | Causal powers are often directional (e.g. centripetal, centrifugal, circulatory) [Ellis] |
22632 | Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality [Ingthorsson] |
13568 | Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure [Ellis] |
13586 | Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures [Ellis] |
13585 | The most fundamental properties of nature (mass, charge, spin ...) all seem to be dispositions [Ellis] |
13596 | A causal power is a disposition to produce forces [Ellis] |
13599 | Powers are dispositions of the essences of kinds that involve them in causation [Ellis] |
13572 | There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals [Ellis] |
13573 | Universals are all types of natural kind [Ellis] |
22627 | Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them [Ingthorsson] |
22613 | Most materialist views postulate smallest indivisible components which are permanent [Ingthorsson] |
13571 | Scientific essentialism doesn't really need Kripkean individual essences [Ellis] |
13578 | The old idea that identity depends on essence and behaviour is rejected by the empiricists [Ellis] |
22612 | Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time [Ingthorsson] |
22625 | Science suggests causal aspects of the constitution and persistance of objects [Ingthorsson] |
22620 | If causation involves production, that needs persisting objects [Ingthorsson] |
13576 | Necessities are distinguished by their grounds, not their different modalities [Ellis] |
13570 | Individual essences necessitate that individual; natural kind essences necessitate kind membership [Ellis] |
22636 | Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless [Ingthorsson] |
22638 | Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied [Ingthorsson] |
13607 | If events are unconnected, then induction cannot be solved [Ellis] |
13597 | Good explanations unify [Ellis] |
13601 | Explanations of particular events are not essentialist, as they don't reveal essential structures [Ellis] |
13569 | To give essentialist explanations there have to be natural kinds [Ellis] |
13600 | The point of models in theories is not to idealise, but to focus on what is essential [Ellis] |
22187 | Genetic behaviours that have enhanced human success include aggression, rape and xenophobia [Wilson,EO, by Okasha] |
13583 | There might be uninstantiated natural kinds, such as transuranic elements which have never occurred [Ellis] |
13574 | Natural kinds are distinguished by resting on essences [Ellis] |
13575 | If there are borderline cases between natural kinds, that makes them superficial [Ellis] |
22605 | Humeans describe the surface of causation, while powers accounts aim at deeper explanations [Ingthorsson] |
22607 | Time and space are not causal, but they determine natural phenomena [Ingthorsson] |
22608 | Casuation is the transmission of conserved quantities between causal processes [Ingthorsson] |
22614 | Interventionist causal theory says it gets a reliable result whenever you manipulate it [Ingthorsson] |
22621 | Causation as transfer only works for asymmetric interactions [Ingthorsson] |
22639 | Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction [Ingthorsson] |
22615 | One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist [Ingthorsson] |
22616 | Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions [Ingthorsson] |
22617 | Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional [Ingthorsson] |
22619 | Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect [Ingthorsson] |
22635 | People only accept the counterfactual when they know the underlying cause [Ingthorsson] |
22634 | Counterfactuals don't explain causation, but causation can explain counterfactuals [Ingthorsson] |
22637 | Counterfactual theories are false in possible worlds where causation is actual [Ingthorsson] |
22624 | A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes [Ingthorsson] |
13595 | Laws don't exist in the world; they are true of the world [Ellis] |
22622 | Any process can go backwards or forwards in time without violating the basic laws of physics [Ingthorsson] |
13566 | A proton must have its causal role, because without it it wouldn't be a proton [Ellis] |
13579 | What is most distinctive of scientific essentialism is regarding processes as natural kinds [Ellis] |
13581 | Scientific essentialism is more concerned with explanation than with identity (Locke, not Kripke) [Ellis] |
13594 | The ontological fundamentals are dispositions, and also categorical (spatio-temporal and structural) properties [Ellis] |
13603 | A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible [Ellis] |
22618 | In modern physics the first and second laws of motion (unlike the third) fail at extremes [Ingthorsson] |
22630 | If particles have decay rates, they can't really be elementary, in the sense of indivisible [Ingthorsson] |
22610 | It is difficult to handle presentism in first-order logic [Ingthorsson] |