Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Interview with Baggini and Stangroom', 'Actualism and Possible Worlds' and 'Sources of the Self'

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18 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / e. Philosophy as reason
We overvalue whether arguments are valid, and undervalue whether they are interesting [Monk]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / a. Nature of Being
Necessary beings (numbers, properties, sets, propositions, states of affairs, God) exist in all possible worlds [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Socrates is a contingent being, but his essence is not; without Socrates, his essence is unexemplified [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds clarify possibility, propositions, properties, sets, counterfacts, time, determinism etc. [Plantinga]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / d. Possible worlds actualism
Plantinga's actualism is nominal, because he fills actuality with possibilia [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 4. Persons as Agents
The modern self has disengaged reason, self-exploration, and personal commitment [Taylor,C]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 2. Ethical Self
My aim is to map the connections between our sense of self and our moral understanding [Taylor,C]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 3. Narrative Self
I can only be aware of myself as a person who changes by means of my personal history [Taylor,C]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Plantinga has domains of sets of essences, variables denoting essences, and predicates as functions [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
Plantinga's essences have their own properties - so will have essences, giving a hierarchy [Stalnaker on Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Are propositions and states of affairs two separate things, or only one? I incline to say one [Plantinga]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
Selfhood and moral values are inextricably intertwined [Taylor,C]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / c. Purpose of ethics
Wittgenstein pared his life down in his search for decency [Monk]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / e. Honour
Willingness to risk life was the constitutive quality of the man of honour [Taylor,C]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
To have respect for people, you must feel their claims, or their injustices, or hold them in awe [Taylor,C]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
Consistency presupposes intrinsic description [Taylor,C]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
In later utilitarianism the modern stress on freedom leads to the rejection of paternalism [Taylor,C]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / d. God decrees morality
Nominalists defended the sovereignty of God against the idea of natural existing good and evil [Taylor,C]