19 ideas
| 14775 | Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce] |
| 14776 | That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce] |
| 3756 | Perception, introspection, testimony, memory, reason, and inference can give us knowledge [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 14770 | Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce] |
| 14774 | Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce] |
| 3757 | Causal theory says true perceptions must be caused by the object perceived [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 14772 | If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce] |
| 14771 | Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce] |
| 14773 | A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce] |
| 3759 | You can acquire new knowledge by exploring memories [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3752 | Justification can be of the belief, or of the person holding the belief [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3753 | Foundationalism aims to avoid an infinite regress [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3754 | Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3755 | Justification is normative, so it can't be reduced to cognitive psychology [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3761 | Modern arguments against the sceptic are epistemological and semantic externalism, and the focus on relevance [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 3760 | Predictions are bound to be arbitrary if they depend on the language used [Bernecker/Dretske] |
| 14769 | Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce] |
| 3643 | The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa [Descartes] |
| 3758 | Semantic externalism ties content to the world, reducing error [Bernecker/Dretske] |