36 ideas
10888 | Sets can be defined by 'enumeration', or by 'abstraction' (based on a property) [Zalabardo] |
10889 | The 'Cartesian Product' of two sets relates them by pairing every element with every element [Zalabardo] |
10890 | A 'partial ordering' is reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive [Zalabardo] |
10886 | Determinacy: an object is either in a set, or it isn't [Zalabardo] |
10887 | Specification: Determinate totals of objects always make a set [Zalabardo] |
10897 | A first-order 'sentence' is a formula with no free variables [Zalabardo] |
10893 | Γ |= φ for sentences if φ is true when all of Γ is true [Zalabardo] |
10899 | Γ |= φ if φ is true when all of Γ is true, for all structures and interpretations [Zalabardo] |
10896 | Propositional logic just needs ¬, and one of ∧, ∨ and → [Zalabardo] |
10898 | The semantics shows how truth values depend on instantiations of properties and relations [Zalabardo] |
10902 | We can do semantics by looking at given propositions, or by building new ones [Zalabardo] |
10892 | We make a truth assignment to T and F, which may be true and false, but merely differ from one another [Zalabardo] |
10895 | 'Logically true' (|= φ) is true for every truth-assignment [Zalabardo] |
10900 | Logically true sentences are true in all structures [Zalabardo] |
10894 | A sentence-set is 'satisfiable' if at least one truth-assignment makes them all true [Zalabardo] |
10901 | Some formulas are 'satisfiable' if there is a structure and interpretation that makes them true [Zalabardo] |
10903 | A structure models a sentence if it is true in the model, and a set of sentences if they are all true in the model [Zalabardo] |
10891 | If a set is defined by induction, then proof by induction can be applied to it [Zalabardo] |
15435 | If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate [Lewis] |
15451 | I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world [Lewis] |
15433 | Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis] |
15436 | Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance [Lewis] |
15438 | We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis] |
15448 | The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts [Lewis] |
15449 | If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals [Lewis] |
15439 | The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts [Lewis] |
15441 | The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over [Lewis] |
15445 | Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures [Lewis] |
15434 | Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts [Lewis] |
15437 | We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals [Lewis] |
15446 | Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples [Lewis] |
15440 | A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology [Lewis] |
15444 | Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times [Lewis] |
15450 | Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction [Lewis] |
3643 | The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa [Descartes] |
15443 | Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one [Lewis] |