Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Principles of Philosophy', 'Properties' and 'Brain Bisection and Unity of Consciousness'

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42 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
The greatest good for a state is true philosophers [Descartes]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong]
To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived
All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another [Descartes]
Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong]
We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
If we perceive an attribute, we infer the existence of some substance [Descartes]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
A substance needs nothing else in order to exist [Descartes]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence [Descartes]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
Total doubt can't include your existence while doubting [Descartes]
I think, therefore I am, because for a thinking thing to not exist is a contradiction [Descartes]
'Thought' is all our conscious awareness, including feeling as well as understanding [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
'Nothing comes from nothing' is an eternal truth found within the mind [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 5. Unity of Mind
Brain bisection suggests unity of mind isn't all-or-nothing [Nagel, by Lockwood]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
We can understand thinking occuring without imagination or sensation [Descartes]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
We may be unable to abandon personal identity, even when split-brains have undermined it [Nagel]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 7. Self and Thinking
In thinking we shut ourselves off from other substances, showing our identity and separateness [Descartes]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Our free will is so self-evident to us that it must be a basic innate idea [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / b. Error
Most errors of judgement result from an inaccurate perception of the facts [Descartes]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong]
There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
We do not praise the acts of an efficient automaton, as their acts are necessary [Descartes]
The greatest perfection of man is to act by free will, and thus merit praise or blame [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 7. Later Matter Theories / c. Matter as extension
Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong]
The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong]