Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Discourse on Method', 'works' and 'Philosophy of Mind'

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61 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Slow and accurate thought makes the greatest progress [Descartes]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Most things in human life seem vain and useless [Descartes]
Almost every daft idea has been expressed by some philosopher [Descartes]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences [Heil]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Methodical thinking is cautious, analytical, systematic, and panoramic [Descartes, by PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
Clear and distinct conceptions are true because a perfect God exists [Descartes]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
Truth is clear and distinct conception - of which it is hard to be sure [Descartes]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 7. Emergent Properties
Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties [Heil]
Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property [Heil]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties [Heil]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat [Heil]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology [Heil]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We can believe a thing without knowing we believe it [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
In morals Descartes accepts the conventional, but rejects it in epistemology [Roochnik on Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
In thinking everything else false, my own existence remains totally certain [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality [Heil]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
I aim to find the principles and causes of everything, using the seeds within my mind [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Understanding, rather than imagination or senses, gives knowledge [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
I was searching for reliable rock under the shifting sand [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
When rebuilding a house, one needs alternative lodgings [Descartes]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Only experiments can settle disagreements between rival explanations [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / e. Questions about mind
Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought [Heil]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 3. Mental Causation
If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind [Heil]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Little reason is needed to speak, so animals have no reason at all [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / a. Consciousness
Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities [Heil]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery [Heil]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world [Heil]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
I am a thinking substance, which doesn't need a place or material support [Descartes]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
I can deny my body and the world, but not my own existence [Descartes]
Reason is universal in its responses, but a physical machine is constrained by its organs [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
The soul must unite with the body to have appetites and sensations [Descartes]
If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 3. Psycho-Functionalism
Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 8. Functionalism critique
If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels [Heil]
Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 3. Eliminativism
It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / a. Physicalism critique
Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised [Heil]
Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things [Heil]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / c. Knowledge argument
A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 1. Thought
Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional? [Heil]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are [Heil]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
A machine could speak in response to physical stimulus, but not hold a conversation [Descartes]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 4. Meaning as Truth-Conditions
Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning' [Heil]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble' [Heil]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them? [Heil]
21. Aesthetics / C. Artistic Issues / 7. Art and Morality
Beauty motivates morality, by harmonising feeling and reason [Schiller, by Pinkard]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Greeks elevate virtues enormously, but never explain them [Descartes]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Schiller speaks obsessively of freedom throughout his works [Schiller, by Berlin]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
God has established laws throughout nature, and implanted ideas of them within us [Descartes]