Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Discourse on Method', 'The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars' and 'Parts of Classes'

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71 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 1. Philosophy
Slow and accurate thought makes the greatest progress [Descartes]
1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Most things in human life seem vain and useless [Descartes]
Almost every daft idea has been expressed by some philosopher [Descartes]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
Methodical thinking is cautious, analytical, systematic, and panoramic [Descartes, by PG]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 4. Circularity
Clear and distinct conceptions are true because a perfect God exists [Descartes]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 8. Subjective Truth
Truth is clear and distinct conception - of which it is hard to be sure [Descartes]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Sets are mereological sums of the singletons of their members [Lewis, by Armstrong]
We can build set theory on singletons: classes are then fusions of subclasses, membership is the singleton [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 2. Mechanics of Set Theory / b. Terminology of ST
Classes divide into subclasses in many ways, but into members in only one way [Lewis]
A subclass of a subclass is itself a subclass; a member of a member is not in general a member [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
We needn't accept this speck of nothingness, this black hole in the fabric of Reality! [Lewis]
We can accept the null set, but there is no null class of anything [Lewis]
There are four main reasons for asserting that there is an empty set [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
We can replace the membership relation with the member-singleton relation (plus mereology) [Lewis]
If we don't understand the singleton, then we don't understand classes [Lewis]
If singleton membership is external, why is an object a member of one rather than another? [Lewis]
Maybe singletons have a structure, of a thing and a lasso? [Lewis]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Set theory has some unofficial axioms, generalisations about how to understand it [Lewis]
Set theory reduces to a mereological theory with singletons as the only atoms [Lewis, by MacBride]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
Set theory isn't innocent; it generates infinities from a single thing; but mathematics needs it [Lewis]
If singletons are where their members are, then so are all sets [Lewis]
A huge part of Reality is only accepted as existing if you have accepted set theory [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
Relations need terms, so they must be second-order entities based on first-order tropes [Campbell,K]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
Plural quantification lacks a complete axiom system [Lewis]
I like plural quantification, but am not convinced of its connection with second-order logic [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / f. Zermelo numbers
Zermelo's model of arithmetic is distinctive because it rests on a primitive of set theory [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
Giving up classes means giving up successful mathematics because of dubious philosophy [Lewis]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
To be a structuralist, you quantify over relations [Lewis]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 2. Types of Existence
Existence doesn't come in degrees; once asserted, it can't then be qualified [Lewis]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are trope-sequences, in which tropes replace one another [Campbell,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture [Lewis]
Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
A property is any class of possibilia [Lewis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K]
Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K]
Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K]
Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K]
Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 1. Physical Objects
Tropes are basic particulars, so concrete particulars are collections of co-located tropes [Campbell,K]
Bundles must be unique, so the Identity of Indiscernibles is a necessity - which it isn't! [Campbell,K]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
The many are many and the one is one, so they can't be identical [Lewis]
Lewis affirms 'composition as identity' - that an object is no more than its parts [Lewis, by Merricks]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
In mereology no two things consist of the same atoms [Lewis]
Trout-turkeys exist, despite lacking cohesion, natural joints and united causal power [Lewis]
Given cats, a fusion of cats adds nothing further to reality [Lewis]
The one has different truths from the many; it is one rather than many, one rather than six [Lewis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Lewis prefers giving up singletons to giving up sums [Lewis, by Fine,K]
Lewis only uses fusions to create unities, but fusions notoriously flatten our distinctions [Oliver/Smiley on Lewis]
A commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment; it is them and they are it [Lewis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Two pure spheres in non-absolute space are identical but indiscernible [Campbell,K]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
We can believe a thing without knowing we believe it [Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
In morals Descartes accepts the conventional, but rejects it in epistemology [Roochnik on Descartes]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 4. The Cogito
In thinking everything else false, my own existence remains totally certain [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 6. A Priori from Reason
I aim to find the principles and causes of everything, using the seeds within my mind [Descartes]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / a. Qualities in perception
Some say qualities are parts of things - as repeatable universals, or as particulars [Lewis]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
Understanding, rather than imagination or senses, gives knowledge [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
I was searching for reliable rock under the shifting sand [Descartes]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
When rebuilding a house, one needs alternative lodgings [Descartes]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Only experiments can settle disagreements between rival explanations [Descartes]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 7. Animal Minds
Little reason is needed to speak, so animals have no reason at all [Descartes]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 3. Self as Non-physical
I am a thinking substance, which doesn't need a place or material support [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 1. Dualism
I can deny my body and the world, but not my own existence [Descartes]
Reason is universal in its responses, but a physical machine is constrained by its organs [Descartes]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 2. Interactionism
The soul must unite with the body to have appetites and sensations [Descartes]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 6. Artificial Thought / c. Turing Test
A machine could speak in response to physical stimulus, but not hold a conversation [Descartes]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
Abstractions come before the mind by concentrating on a part of what is presented [Campbell,K]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
Greeks elevate virtues enormously, but never explain them [Descartes]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
Davidson can't explain causation entirely by events, because conditions are also involved [Campbell,K]
Causal conditions are particular abstract instances of properties, which makes them tropes [Campbell,K]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
God has established laws throughout nature, and implanted ideas of them within us [Descartes]