57 ideas
3600 | Slow and accurate thought makes the greatest progress [Descartes] |
3601 | Most things in human life seem vain and useless [Descartes] |
3602 | Almost every daft idea has been expressed by some philosopher [Descartes] |
3603 | Methodical thinking is cautious, analytical, systematic, and panoramic [Descartes, by PG] |
10041 | Impredicative Definitions refer to the totality to which the object itself belongs [Gödel] |
3612 | Clear and distinct conceptions are true because a perfect God exists [Descartes] |
3610 | Truth is clear and distinct conception - of which it is hard to be sure [Descartes] |
21716 | In simple type theory the axiom of Separation is better than Reducibility [Gödel, by Linsky,B] |
10035 | Mathematical Logic is a non-numerical branch of mathematics, and the supreme science [Gödel] |
10042 | Reference to a totality need not refer to a conjunction of all its elements [Gödel] |
10038 | A logical system needs a syntactical survey of all possible expressions [Gödel] |
10046 | The generalized Continuum Hypothesis asserts a discontinuity in cardinal numbers [Gödel] |
10039 | Some arithmetical problems require assumptions which transcend arithmetic [Gödel] |
10043 | Mathematical objects are as essential as physical objects are for perception [Gödel] |
10045 | Impredicative definitions are admitted into ordinary mathematics [Gödel] |
12747 | Monads are not extended, but have a kind of situation in extension [Leibniz] |
12748 | Only monads are substances, and bodies are collections of them [Leibniz] |
13184 | The division of nature into matter makes distinct appearances, and that presupposes substances [Leibniz] |
13188 | The only indications of reality are agreement among phenomena, and their agreement with necessities [Leibniz] |
12752 | Only unities have any reality [Leibniz] |
13187 | In actual things nothing is indefinite [Leibniz] |
19383 | A man's distant wife dying is a real change in him [Leibniz] |
13179 | A complete monad is a substance with primitive active and passive power [Leibniz] |
12749 | Derivate forces are in phenomena, but primitive forces are in the internal strivings of substances [Leibniz] |
12722 | Thought terminates in force, rather than extension [Leibniz] |
19379 | The law of the series, which determines future states of a substance, is what individuates it [Leibniz] |
13182 | Changeable accidents are modifications of unchanging essences [Leibniz] |
13178 | Things in different locations are different because they 'express' those locations [Leibniz] |
19412 | If two bodies only seem to differ in their position, those different environments will matter [Leibniz] |
19411 | In nature there aren't even two identical straight lines, so no two bodies are alike [Leibniz] |
3605 | We can believe a thing without knowing we believe it [Descartes] |
1583 | In morals Descartes accepts the conventional, but rejects it in epistemology [Roochnik on Descartes] |
3607 | In thinking everything else false, my own existence remains totally certain [Descartes] |
3617 | I aim to find the principles and causes of everything, using the seeds within my mind [Descartes] |
3611 | Understanding, rather than imagination or senses, gives knowledge [Descartes] |
3606 | I was searching for reliable rock under the shifting sand [Descartes] |
19410 | Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena [Leibniz] |
3604 | When rebuilding a house, one needs alternative lodgings [Descartes] |
3618 | Only experiments can settle disagreements between rival explanations [Descartes] |
3615 | Little reason is needed to speak, so animals have no reason at all [Descartes] |
13183 | Primitive forces are internal strivings of substances, acting according to their internal laws [Leibniz] |
3609 | I am a thinking substance, which doesn't need a place or material support [Descartes] |
3608 | I can deny my body and the world, but not my own existence [Descartes] |
3613 | Reason is universal in its responses, but a physical machine is constrained by its organs [Descartes] |
19409 | Soul represents body, but soul remains unchanged, while body continuously changes [Leibniz] |
3616 | The soul must unite with the body to have appetites and sensations [Descartes] |
3614 | A machine could speak in response to physical stimulus, but not hold a conversation [Descartes] |
11873 | Our notions may be formed from concepts, but concepts are formed from things [Leibniz] |
13186 | Universals are just abstractions by concealing some of the circumstances [Leibniz] |
1581 | Greeks elevate virtues enormously, but never explain them [Descartes] |
13185 | Even if extension is impenetrable, this still offers no explanation for motion and its laws [Leibniz] |
13177 | An entelechy is a law of the series of its event within some entity [Leibniz] |
16686 | God has established laws throughout nature, and implanted ideas of them within us [Descartes] |
13093 | The only permanence in things, constituting their substance, is a law of continuity [Leibniz] |
13096 | The force behind motion is like a soul, with its own laws of continual change [Leibniz] |
13180 | Space is the order of coexisting possibles [Leibniz] |
13181 | Time is the order of inconsistent possibilities [Leibniz] |